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Insider Trading and Market Structure
Yesha Yadav4
ABSTRACT
This Article argues that the emergence of algorithmic trading raises a significant
challenge for the law and policy of insider trading. It shows that securities markets
are dominated by a cohort of "structural insiders," namely a set of traders able to utilize
close physical and informational access to trade at speeds measured in milliseconds
and microseconds, a practice loosely termed high frequency trading (HFT). By virtue
of speed and physical proximity to exchanges, these HFT traders can systematically
gain first access to new information, trade on it, and change prices before the rest
of the market can see its content. this Article makes three contributions. First, it
introduces and develops the concept of structural insider trading. Securities markets
increasingly rely on automated traders utilizing algorithms-or pre-programmed
electronic instructions-for trading. Policy allows traders to enjoy important structural
advantages: (i) to physically locate on or next to an exchange, shortening the time it
takes for information to travel to and from the marketplace; and (ii) to receive feeds of
richly detailed data directly to these co-located trading operations. With algorithms
sophisticated enough to respond instantly and independently to new information,
co-located automated traders can receive and trade on not-fully-public information
ahead of other investors. Indeed, by the time that the rest of the market sees this
information, it has long since become out-of-date. Secondly, this Article shows that
structural insider trading exhibits harms that are substantially similar to those regulated
under conventional theories of corporate insider trading. Structural insiders place other
investors at a persistent informational disadvantage. through their first sight of market-
moving data, structural insiders can capture the best trades and erode the profits of
informed traders, reducing their incentives to participate in the marketplace. Despite
the similarity in harms, however, this Article shows that current doctrine does not apply
to restrict structural insider trading. Rather, structural insiders thrive in full public
view, and with regulatory permission. thirdly, this Article explores the implications of
structural insider trading for the theory and doctrine of insider trading. It shows them
to be increasingly incoherent in their application. In protecting investors against one
set of insiders but not another, law and policy appear under profound strain in the face
of innovative markets.
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Insider Trading and High-Frequency Trading
INTRODUCTION
With high-speed algorithms driving around 50-70 percent of all share
trading in the United States by volume, automation has become the norm in the
securities marketplace.1 The effect of electronic trading, however, extends far
beyond the simple fact of how shares are bought and sold. It challenges the the-
oretical foundation anchoring the prohibition against insider trading and the al-
location of informational costs the law imposes between traders. This Article
shows how the design of modern automated markets departs from past practice
by expressly giving meaningful informational advantages to select, high-speed
algorithmic traders. By dint of this structural access, a small cohort of firms are
the first to receive, review, and react to trading information-enabling them to
use this early intelligence to anticipate how others might trade. Such structural
insider trading, as this Article terms it, creates the same type of harms for inves-
tors and market quality as is commonly seen in more conventional corporate in-
sider trading schemes. Yet, unlike conventional corporate insider trading,
traditional legal doctrine does not constrain structural insiders. By looking at
the institutionalization of harmful asymmetries in informational access between
investors, this Article draws into relief the inability of the prohibition against in-
sider trading to effectively perform its role as a protective safeguard for confiden-
tial information in modern markets.
It is well established that the prohibition against insider trading serves to
safeguard investors from systematically losing to better-informed insiders.2 The
law penalizes insiders that secretly profit from their knowledge at the expense of
other investors, creating powerful motivation for insiders to either disclose their
confidences or to refrain from trading.3 Viewed from the perspective of the
1. Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, Commentary, High Frequency Traders: Angels or Devils?, 391 C.D.
HOWE INST. COMMENT. 1, 2 (2013), https://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/Commentary 391.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M2D3-BR2X]. For an informative analysis of high frequency trading and
key claims and controversies, see generally Merritt B. Fox et al., The New Stock Market: Sense and
Nonsense, 65 DUKE L.J. 191 (2015).
2. For overviews, see DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION,
ENFORCEMENT & PREVENTION §§ 1:1-6 (2015); WILLIAM KIS. WANG & MARC I.
STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING §§ 2:1-4 (2d ed. 2008). See also Victor Brudney, Insiders,
Outsiders, and InformationalAdvantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322,
354-58 (1979) (discussing the rationale underlying the prohibition of insider trading).
3. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'don other grounds, 446 F.2d
1301 (2d Cir. 1971); see also Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654, 659, 662 (1983); Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 226-29 (1980); In re Merrill Lynch, Exchange Act Release No. 8459, 43
S.E.C. 933, 936-37 (Nov. 25, 1968) (noting the centrality of fairness for investors as a guiding
motivation for doctrine). For an analysis of the historical evolution of early insider trading doctrine
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capital markets, protecting an ordinary investor's bargaining position against in-
siders can bring significant, system-wide benefits. For one, it allows investors of
all types-not just insiders-to enter the fray to trade, increasing the capital
available for investment. Importantly, their dollars might also go farther than
those of insiders. Knowing that they are not predestined to fail against informed
insiders, outside investors may be willing to infuse more money into securities
markets. With strong laws to buttress their position, investors need not discount
the value of their capital to reflect the risk of being of picked off by informed in-
siders.4
The theory and application of the law against insider trading, however,
remains controversial and heavily contested. The doctrine is notoriously
fuzzy and complicated, straining to adapt to the many mechanisms by which
confidential information may be shared and misused by traders in modern
markets.5 Moreover, scholars have vigorously disputed the economic ration-
ales underpinning the legal foundations of the prohibition. Henry Manne,
Dennis Carlton, and Daniel Fischel, for example, argue that laws against in-
sider trading actually operate to the detriment of market quality by reducing
the informational richness that guides everyday trading.6 Insiders necessarily
possess the deepest, most accurate reserves of knowledge about a company
and its securities. According to this literature, imposing legal constraints on
their ability to trade reduces the aggregate intelligence available in capital
and its application by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), see Donald C.
Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading Regulation, 99
COLuM. L. REV. 1319,1320-31 (1999).
4. See, e.g., LANGEVOORT, supra note 2; WANG &STEINBERG, supra note 2; William Y(S. Wang,
Trading on MaterialNon-Public Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who Is Harmed, and Who
Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule lOb-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217, 1227-29 (1981) (detailing the
key harms of insider trading). In the finance literature, see notably David Easley & Maureen
O'Hara, Information and the Cost of Capital, 59 J. FIN. 1553 (2004) (showing that investors demand
a higher rate of return to hold securities with higher private information).
5. Seegenerally United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014) (overturning an insider trading
conviction where it was not shown that the tippers derived personal benefits from the disclosures or
that the tippees knew that the disclosed information was private); SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276,
286-87 (2d Cir. 2012) (allowing insider trading liability where a tipper does not know that a tippee
will use a disclosure for trading); SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42,47-51 (2d Cir. 2009) (expanding
insider trading liability to cover a hacker who stole information for trading, even though he lacked a
fiduciary duty). For wide-ranging commentary on Newman, see Ilya Beylin, Marketplace of Ideas:
United States v. Newman, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 28, 2015), http://
clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/01/28/marketplace-of-ideas -united-states -v-newman-4
[http://perma.cc/BSRQ-B2F4]. For discussion of the fiduciary principle in insider trading, see
generally Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise ofFiduciary Principles, 94 IOWA
L. REV. 1315 (2009) (analyzing the uneven application of the fiduciary principle in insider trading).
6. Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation ofInsider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857
(1983).
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markets-undermining market efficiency and the ease by which securities
prices accurately capture available information Far from being a matter of
inviolable policy, regulating insider trading in securities markets represents a
trade-off. Investors might gain protection against opportunistic trading by
insiders. But the market as a whole also loses a critical lens into the inner
workings of public companies. With thinner reserves of information to un-
derpin price formation, markets are thus primed to underperform in fulfilling
their core function: allowing investors to deduce more exactly the future cash
flows of investments and how to deploy their capital most effectively to gen-
erate greatest return.8
The interplay of these competing rationales can be seen in the design of
market structure-the processes and mechanisms by which securities are bought
and sold in public trading.9 Historically, markets have relied on a select cohort of
institutional traders to manage the ebb and flow of trades. These firms have been
called on to buy securities using their own money when no one else is willing-
and to sell securities from their own books to help markets cope with unexpected
demand. In performing this "market making" function, ensuring that trading
remains smooth, orderly, and liquid,0 this group of firms has occupied a central
role in intermediating trading across an enormous swath of the market. On the
7. See zenerallv HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966)
(presenting a key discussion of the efficiency-reducing impact of insider trading laws); Carlton &
Fischel, supra note 6. For notable critiques and discussion on insider trading on efficiency, see
generally James D. Cox, Insider Tradiny and Contractiny:A Critical Response to the "Chicayo School",
1986 DUKE L.J. 628 (1986) (arguing based on the capital market theory that insider trading does
not harm market efficiency while offering alternative justifications for continuing regulation); Jesse
M. Fried, Insider Abstention, 113 YALE L.J. 455 (2003) (arguing that insiders do not beat the
market by abstaining from trading); Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider Tradinz;
Markets, and "Neative" PropertV Riyhts in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229 (2001) (observing the
impediment created by insider trading laws to the flow of information in the market and arguing
for allocation of informational rights to specialists). On market efficiency, see Eugene F. Fama,
Efficient Capital Markets.'A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970) ("A
market in which prices always 'fidly reflect' available information is called 'efficient."'); see also
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV.
549, 549-53 (1984) (describing the efficient capital market hypothesis); Yesha Yadav, How
Alyorithmic Tradiny Undermines Efficiency in Capital Markets (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Law &
Econ. Working Paper No. 15-7,2015). Theories are discussed infra Part I.A
8. Philip Bond et al., The Real Effects of Financial Markets, 4 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 339, 342-46
(2012) (analyzing the informational impact of prices and observing the importance of securities
prices on real-world decision making).
9. For discussion, see generally Yesha Yadav, Insider Tradiny in Derivatives Markets, 103 GEO. L.J.
381 (2015) (analyzing the theory behind regulations on insider trading and considering how such
regulations can be refined based on theory).
10. See, e.g., Rule 104. Dealings and Responsibilities ofDMMs, NYSE, 104(f)(), (December 15, 2015),
http://nysenles.nyse.com/nyse/ndes/nyse-ndes/chp 1 3/chp 1 3 7/chp 1 3 7 8/default.asp
[http://perma.cc/RUYS-EULP] [hereinafter NYSE Rule 104(0(ii)].
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New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), for example, "specialist" market makers
were contracted to match securities buyers with sellers, to act as buyer and seller if
needed, as well as to maintain "fair and orderly" markets when no one else wished
to trade.1 The NASDAQ has traditionally relied on competing sets of "dealers"
to intermediate transactions between investors.12 As essential checkpoints for se-
curities trading, their position has raised the risk that this small group of traders
might utilize information for private gain, undercutting investors at large.3 In
response, reflecting the regulatory emphasis on protecting investor information,
an elaborate body of laws has worked to constrain the behavior of traditional
market makers and to place costs on their ability to utilize trading information
for personal trades.4 Indeed, owing to these rules, finance theory widely accepts
that this select group-despite all the privileges of their position-behave like
uninformed traders. Market makers, far from minting money from their access
to exchange data, appear to lose money to informed investors. Put differently,
the law works to protect informed investors from seeing the fruits of their intelli-
gence systematically eroded by market makers with the positional power to see
11. Inside the NYSE: The Specialist, NYSE, 1-4, https://web.archive.org/web/20140824070657/
http://wwwl.nyse.con/pdfs/specialistmagartide.pdf It should be noted that the NYSE has
moved to dismantle the "specialist" fimction in favor of designated market makers and, in this
change, have stopped specialists from seeing all available information on order flow. Designated
Market Makers, NYSE, https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/listing/fact sheet dmm.pdf
[https://perma.ccV\J3S-Y3RH] (last visited Mar. 6, 2016).
12. See Katrina Ellis et al., The Making ofa Dealer Market- From Enhy to Equilibrium in the Trading of
Nasdaq Stocks, 57 J. FIN. 2289 (2002). For discussions on the fimctioning of market makers, see
generally Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Dealers'p Market: Market-Making With Inventory,
8 J. FIN. ECON. 31 (1980) (examining the management of inventory by a monopolistic market
maker). See also Robert Battalio et al., Payment for Order Flow, Trading Costs, and Dealer
Revenue for Market Orders at Knight Securities, L.P. (Dec. 1998) (unpublished manuscript),
http://pricing.free.fr/docs/vwap/knight.pdf [http://perma.cc/PSE6-BBBM] (discussing the
impact on spreads of the practice of broker-dealers purchasing order flows from retail investors).
This literature is discussed in more detail infra Part I.B.
13. See Raymond P.H. Fishe & Michel A. Robe, The Impact of Illegal Insider Trading in Dealer and
Specialist Markets Evidence From a Natural Experiment, 71 J. FIN. ECON. 461, 462-64 (2004)
(noting the ability of dealers to manage the risks of trading against corporate insiders by
strategically adjusting the depth of their order books). But see Hendrik Bessembinder et al., Why
Designate Market Makers? Affirmative Obligations and Market Quality (Dec. 2011)
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=989061 (arguing
that designated market makers operating under maximum spread rules enhance allocative
efficiency).
14. See William G. Christie & Paul H. Schultz, Wby Do NASDAQ Market MakersAvoid Odd-Eighth
Quotes? 49 J. FIN. 1813, 1834-38 (1994) (suggesting that dealers engage in collusion to
maintaining higher spreads on the NASDAQexchange); Prajit K. Dutta & Ananth Madhavan,
Competition and Collusion in Dealer Markets, 52 J. FIN. 245, 248, 265, 268 (1997) (observing that
there are limited incentives for even competing dealers to reduce a high spread). On the laws
traditionally applying to market makers, see discussion infra Part I.B.2.
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information early and to transact on this information ahead of others in the
market.15
This delicate regulatory bargain has, however, seen a radical transfor-
mation with the arrival of high-speed algorithmic traders-automated elec-
tronic traders that use algorithms, or preprogrammed electronic instructions,
to trade.6 Capable of buying and selling thousands of securities within milli-
seconds and realizing tiny incremental gains on each trade, algorithmic trad-
ers rely on rapid turnover to make their money and manage their risks, in a
strategy known as high frequency trading (HFT).7 By virtue of constantly
buying and selling, these HFT traders often fulfill what amounts to an eco-
nomic market making function by being immediately available to trade with
investors.8 Where traders can buy and sell at pace, exiting quickly and often,
their exposure to risk is fleeting, measured usually in fractions of a second.
Facing lower provisioning costs, and often no legal obligations to trade in
times of stress, algorithmic firms possess powerful incentives to play market
maker on modern exchanges.9
15. See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
16. See JOHN BATES, ALGORITHMIC TRADING AND HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING:
EXPERIENCES FROM THE MARKET AND THOUGHTS ON REGULATORY REQLUIREMENTS 1
(2010) ("An algorithm is 'a sequence of steps to achieve a goal'-and the general case of algorithmic
trading is 'using a computer to automate a trading strategy."'), http://www.cftc.gov/
idc/groups/public/@newsroon/documents/fe/tac 071410 binder.pdf [http://perma.cc/D473-
YNZE]; THOMAS H. CORMEN ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO ALGORITHMS 5-6 (3d ed. 2009);
TECH. COMM., INT'L ORG. SEC. COMMNS, REGULATORY ISSUES RAISED BY THE IMPACT
OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES ON MARKET INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY:
CONSULTATION REPORT 10 (2011), [http://perma.cc/AJG6-C65A] ("In its simplest guise,
algorithmic trading may just involve the use of a basic algorithm... to feed portions of an order
into the market at pre-set intervals to minimize market impact cost. At its most complex, it may
entail many algorithms that are able to assimilate information from multiple markets . . . in
fractions of a second."). For discussion and comparison between traditional market makers and
high-speed traders, see Bessembinder et al., supra note 13.
17. See discussion infra Part I.B.
18. Albert J. Menkveld, High Frequency Trading and the New Market Makers, 16 J. FIN. MKTS. 712,
714-16 (2013) (discussing the benefit of this market making fumction for lowering the spreads
investors pay to trade). But see X. Frank Zhang, High-Frequency Trading, Stock Volatility, and
Price Discovery 2-3 (Dec. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (arguing that high frequency trading
increases stock volatility). For a general review of the literature on high frequency trading, see
generally STAFF OF THE DIV. OF TRADING &MKTS., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, EQIiTY
MARKET STRUCTURE LITERATURE REVIEW PART II: HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING 4-7
(2014), https://www.sec.gov/marketstructure/research/hft lit review march 2014.pdf [https://
perma.cc/G6SJ-SGCX] [hereinafter SEC LITERATURE REVIEW].
19. Note that Virtu Financial, a well-known high-speed trading firm, is contracted to act as designated
market maker for the NYSE. See Market Model Overviev, NYSE, https://www.nyse.con/
market-model [https://perma.cc/FHV6-PX63] (last visited Mar. 6, 2016); Designated Market
Makers, VIRTU FIN. http://www.virtu.coni/designated-market-makers/ [https://perma.cc/SVVIUS-
NY48] (last visited Mar. 8, 2016).
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HFT traders need eep informational access to the marketplace in order to
function. Their ability to transact in milliseconds demands close physical access
to exchange infrastructure; traders must possess physical proximity to an ex-
change to reduce the time taken for orders to reach the venue. In turn, they must
be able to receive data rapidly from the marketplace and to react to it by immedi-
ately sending orders back to the exchange. Without such proximity, HET trad-
ers lose their competitive edge.
Exchanges have responded by recasting their architecture to offer this
proximity to traders. They sell physical space to firms to "co-locate" servers on
or next to those of an exchange. Traders can also purchase detailed feeds of the
exchange's data that can then be sent directly to the trader's co-located servers.
Finally, HET traders can only function when algorithms are preprogrammed to
react automatically to new information as it emerges-without waiting for hu-
man beings to vet trades in real time.21 These dynamics together place HET
traders in a prime position to make reliable, informed gains ahead of other inves-
tors, to anticipate where markets are headed, and to reach the best trades. While
finance theory has typically concluded that traditional market makers are largely
uninformed, the emergence of HiT traders suggests a different conclusion. In-
creasingly, studies reveal HET traders to be skilled at predicting the near term
direction in which markets are headed and in anticipating and trading ahead of
order flow.22
Perhaps most critically, however, this structural access gives high-speed
traders an outsized role in price formation vis-A-vis other types of traders.
Through a combination of co-location, direct feeds, and automated reactions to
incoming information, HET traders can enjoy first-sight and first-mover trading
advantages. Indeed, it is nearly impossible for structural outsiders to transact on
up-to-the-millisecond price information. Because of co-location, direct feeds,
and immediate, automated reaction, high-speed traders can receive and react to
20. See Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & Joshua R. Mitts, How the SEC Helps Speedy Traders 1-3 (Columbia
Law Sch. Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 501, 2014) (reporting that the
Securities and Exchange System itself was disseminating EDGAR regulatory filings to HFT
traders before other investors in the market); see also Jonathan L. Rogers et al., Run EDGAR Run:
SEC'Dissemination i  a High-Frequency World 1-4 (Univ. of Chi. Booth Sch. of Bus., Fama-Miller
Ctr. for Research in Fin., Chi. Booth Paper No. 14-36, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/
public/resources/documents/1029sechft.pdf [http://perma.cc/577E-SEWH].
21. These mechanisms are discussed infra Part II. For a study on SEC data and HFT processing, see
Robert J. Jackson, Jr. et al., How Quickly Do Markets Learn? Private Information Dissemination
in a Natural Experiment 4 (Mar. 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.columbia.edu/
-wj2006/info dissemination.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CDX-UQ49] (noting that fimdamental
information takes longer for HFT to process vis-a-vis news orientated information).
22. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1-IV.A.2.
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information before it even reaches traders outside of a co-located space. As
shown in Appendix 1, by the time information travels more broadly, high-speed
traders have already transacted on it, with the result that when outsiders finally
catch sight of prices, the prices have long since become outdated.23
This Article shows that modern markets are reliant on a cohort of high-
speed "structural" insiders that receive and react to information ahead of those on
the outside. Due to their ability to see and trade on not-fully-public information
before anyone else, structural insiders also dominate the price formation process.
This insider-advantage represents a radical departure from traditional models
that have sought to prevent market makers from utilizing their access to exchange
information for private gain. This Article analyzes the emergence of structural
insiders against the theory underpinning the prohibition against insider trading.
It shows that the harms of structural insider trading broadly resemble those
commonly controlled under the prohibition. Yet, as this Article makes clear, the
structural advantages for HET traders are perfectly legal under the current doc-
trine. Their use thrives in full view and largely enjoys the blessing of regulators,
negating liability under the prohibition.4 In highlighting the incompatibility
23. See, e.g., Robert Jarrow & Phillip Protter, A Dysfunctional Role of High Freuency Trading in
Electronic Markets, 15 INT'L J. THEORETICAL & APPLIED FIN. 1250022-1, 1250022-3 to
1250022-6, 1250022-12 (2012). In the popular literature, see, for example, MICHAEL LEWIS,
FLASH Boys: A WALL STREET REVOLT (2014); SCOTT PATTERSON, DARK POOLS: THE
RISE OF THE MACHINE TRADERS AND THE RIGGING OF THE U.S. STOCK MARKET 322-33
(2013). It should be noted that these costs are complex, and some scholars dispute the real costs to
investors of high frequency trading. These debates are discussed infra Parts II and IV.
24. In September 2012, the SEC fined the NYSE to settle allegations that the NYSE had provided
information to paid subscribers ahead of other traders, violating rules requiring the exchange to
provide market data on a fair and reasonable basis. In re NYSE, Exchange Act Release No. 67857,
104 SEC Docket 2455 (Sept. 14, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2012/34-
67857.pdf [https://perma.cc/APC3-J9Z9]. For more recent governmental responses to unfair
competitive advantages of HFT, see, for example, Jackson &Mitts, supra note 20, at 13-15 (noting
that, even after reports of unfair receipt of EDGAR filings surfaced, EDGAR continued to send
most filings to high frequency traders ahead of other traders); Karen Freifeld & Nadia Damouni,
Exclusive-New York Attorney General Eyes Exchanges in High Frequency Probe: Sources, REUTERS
(May 2, 2014, 9:47 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-highfrequency-nyag-exclusive-
idUSBREA4101120140502 [http://perma.cc/W7FC-RS64] (discussing the New York Attorney
General's investigation of exchanges providing information to high frequency trading before other
traders); Keri Geiger & Sam Mamudi, High-Speed Trading Faces New York Probe Into Fairness,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 18, 2014, 1:15 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-03-
18/high-speed-trading-said-to-face-n-y-probe-into-fairness [http://perma.cc/TW4A-M6ZJ];
Peter Lattman, Thomson Reuters To Suspend Early Peeks at Key Index, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2013,
9:06 PM), http://dealboolnytimes.com/2013/07/07/thomson-reuters-to-suspend-early-peeks-
at-key-index/? r=1 [http://perma.cc/9H8P-RN3F] (noting the agreement o suspend early release
of the University of Michigan's Consumer Confidence Index to paying investors, who received the
information two seconds before general release); Kara Scannell &Nicole Bullock, SECFinesJYSE
Euronext $4.5mfor Breaking Rules, FIN. TIMES (May 1, 2014, 11:19 PM), http://www.ft.com/
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between the theoretical underpinning of the prohibition against insider trading
and the current practices of HiT structural insiders, this Article draws into relief
the weakness of the prohibition as a broad protective safeguard for market in-
formation.
This Article makes three contributions. First, it examines the longstanding
regulatory bargain that has worked to constrain market makers in utilizing their
access to information for private gain.2" An elaborate body of rules has been de-
veloped to even the playing field between market makers and at-large investors in
public markets, preventing insiders from systematically picking off the most fa-
vorable deals. The emergence of HFT traders-while greatly facilitating trades
and serving as an economic market maker-challenges the core of this bargain.
High frequency traders are expressly permitted to physically co-locate and to di-
rect rich data feeds from exchanges to co-located servers, making it possible for a
group of insiders to gain unprecedented access to the price formation processes in
modem markets.
Second, taking established theories of insider trading as its starting point,
this Article analyzes the costs and benefits of structural insider trading. On the
one hand, structural insiders bring myriad benefits. Scholars note that markets
are more liquid, efficient, and cheaper to use. They are more heterogeneous in
their composition and are home to sophisticated experts able to trade with speed,
intelligence, and data to bring rapid price formation to investors at large.26 Struc-
tural asymmetries between investors, however, also come with costs. This Article
shows that the harms arising from structural insider trading are remarkably close
in substance to those decried under the conventional theory of corporate insider
trading. Notably, structural insiders can systematically win against other investors
by the simple fact of their positional advantage." Studies note that informed in-
vestors consistently suffer losses to HET traders.28 Further, deep inequalities in
the dissemination of trading information can generate uneven distributions of
transactional costs, forcing those with diminished data to spend more to achieve
parity with structural insiders. As with corporate insider trading, some scholars
point to a potentially deeper harm to market quality. If institutional investors
reduce their participation in markets or are motivated to opt-out altogether
cms/s/0/578b5124-dl4b- 11e3-81e0-00144feabdc.html#axzz3z4mlhlGI [perma.cc/38KM-
BTE3].
25. See, e.g., Christie &Schultz, supra note 14; Dutta &Madhavan, supra note 14.
26. See discussion infra Part II.A-
27. See discussion infra Part II.A; see also Jackson &Mitts, supra note 20, at 1-3 (noting that high speed
trades made gains in the time lag between which they received information from EDGAR and
when this information was received more widely).
28. See discussion infra Part III.B.
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on account of the increased costs, markets can end up less informative and
diminished in their ability to allocate capital.29
Third, this Article points to the need for a thorough rethinking of the doc-
trine and theory undergirding the prohibition against insider trading. The cur-
rent design of market structures poses a serious challenge to the standard theory's
ability to draw coherent doctrinal and policy lines. As a starting point, structural
insider trading redraws the classic battle lines between market efficiency and in-
vestor protection. In traditional corporate insider trading doctrine, market effi-
ciency has generally ceded to the goal of investor protection, establishing a
system of restraints irrespective of the costs to market efficiency. Structural in-
sider trading, however, recalibrates this old debate. Unlike informed corporate
insiders, co-located high frequency traders do not bring new information to the
marketplace. Rather, HET traders see new information earlier than other inves-
tors, giving them an opportunity to trade first and update prices as a conse-
quence of their access. In this sense, they do not render the market more
informed by their insider trading, they are just faster at reflecting information
that would arrive anyway. Still, high frequency traders bring a form of"structur-
al efficiency' to markets, owing to the speed and liquidity gains they offer. In
seeking to deal with the costs and trade-offs, policymakers essentially face two
choices: (i) to bring structural insider trading within the ambit of current insider
trading laws; or (ii) to deal with the implications of irreconcilability. This Arti-
cle proposes ideas for the former, while recognizing that the latter is the likelier
outcome. In the absence of reform, the pervasive spread of functional insider
trading in markets-well outside the reach of the current doctrine-reveals that
the traditional prohibition is sorely lacking in theoretical coherence.
To be clear, this Article does not seek to imply that HET ranks as an abu-
sive practice undertaken in violation of the law. Evidently, it is not. The theory
and doctrine of insider trading, however, offer a powerful analytical lens through
which to understand the systematic informational advantages enjoyed by a sub-
set of traders and the costs and benefits these generate for the marketplace. By
connecting established theory with emerging market design, this Article draws
into relief the unique allocation of informational access in modern securities
trading.
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I describes the significance of mar-
ket makers to trading. It examines their core functions and demonstrates that,
even though they have traditionally intermediated an enormous swath of trades
and enjoyed positional access to information, they still behave like uninformed
29. See discussion infra Part III.B.
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traders in the market. In other words, conventional market makers generally lose
to informed traders, not vice versa. Part II moves to analyze the emergence of
HFTs as a dominant paradigm in trading-with traders able to make system-
atic gains through their physical and informational access to the marketplace
and early sight of trading data. Part III provides a short primer on the theory
and doctrine of insider trading, with Part IV mapping its key tenets onto struc-
tural insider trading. In concluding, this Article surveys implications for reform
and examines structural solutions designed to better price the systematic informa-
tional advantage enjoyed by HET traders.
I. WHY MARKET STRUCTURE IS SPECIAL
Securities markets channel surplus capital from investors to enterprises that
can use this money most efficiently for growth. The primary market for capi-
tal-when a company first issues its securities to the public-offers the most di-
rect injection of investor funds into a company's coffers. Secondary markets, on
the other hand, provide the mechanism by which investors enter and exit these
investments, transacting with one another to ensure that capital is mobile and
liquid. Secondary markets might not immediately infuse worthy businesses with
cash, but they nevertheless perform essential allocative and expressive functions.
As Alex Edmans, Itay Goldstein, and Wei Jiang observe, stock prices exert a
powerful impact on corporate decisionmaking and can encourage tighter moni-
toring of firm management by investors.30
30. See Alex Edmans, Itay Goldstein &Wei Jiang, The Real Effects ofFinancialMarkets." The Impact of
Prices on Takeovers, 67 J. FIN. 933, 933-39 (2012) (discussing the impact of prices on takeover
decisions); Yadav, supra note 7, at 28-30 (analyzing the impact of prices on corporate governance);
see also Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, The "Wall Street Walk" and ShareholderActivism: Exit as a
Form of Voice, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2445 (2009) (examining the influence of shareholders and
shareholder voice on resolving conflicts within management); Philip Bond et al., Market-Based
Corrective Actions, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 781, 781-82 (2010) (noting that corporations use market
prices to discipline management); Stanley Fischer & Robert C. Merton, Macroeconomics and
Finance: The Role of the Stock Market (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
1291, 1984), http://www.nber.org/papers/w1291.pdf [http://perma.cc/NSPA-WQVT]
(describing the close relationship between the stock market and the business cycle); James Dow et
al., Incentives for Information Production in Markets Where Prices Affect Real Investment (May 27,
2015), (unpublished manuscript) http://fmance.wharton.upenn.edu/itayg/Files/information
production.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BD6-ALVS] (discussing how small changes in markets can
effect great changes in investments and firm management). For firther discussion on capital
allocation and markets, see Franklin Allen, Stock Markets and Resource Allocation, in CAPITAL
MARKETS AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 81 (Colin Mayer & Xavier Vives eds., 1993)
(discussing international markets and capital allocation); Solomon Tadesse, The Allocation and
Monitoring Role of Capital Markets Theory and International Evidence, 39 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 701 (2004); Jeffrey Wurgler, Financial Markets and the Allocation of
Capital, (Yale Int'l Ctr. for Fin. Working Paper No. 99-08,1999).
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The structure of markets and their transactional mechanics enable price
formation and capital allocation to flourish. Finance academics have long recog-
nized the impact of a market's "microstructure"-the processes and machinery
that underlie trading-on efficient stock market performance and capital invest-
ment.1 This Part examines the fundamental pillars of market design to show
that it constitutes an arena of contention between two (sometimes) competing
goals of regulatory policy: investor protection and market efficiency. Ideally,
markets seek to encourage maximum information in trading in order to make
prices as informative as possible. At the same time, regulation seeks to protect in-
vestors that might only enter markets where they are protected from being sys-
tematically outmaneuvered by various types of informed insiders. This tension is
visible in the institution of the market maker-the firm or set of firms entrusted
with ensuring that markets remain liquid and stable and whose central role can
give them systematic informational advantages over other investors.
A. Information and Market Structure
1. The Primacy of Efficiency
Conventional economic theory underscores the importance of information
for capital allocation in securities markets. In his seminal work, Eugene Fama
posited that developed markets arc towards a state of efficiency.2 According to
this hypothesis-known as the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis (ECMH)-
prices come to reflect all available information. Securities pricing thus represents a
rich signal of what securities (and the companies that issue them) are actually
31. For an overview of market microstructures, stock market performance, and capital investment, see
generally LARRY HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES: MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE FOR
PRACTITIONERS (2003).
32. See Fama, supra note 7, at 383-84, 413-16; see also Eugene F. Fama, Market Efficiency, Long-Term
Returns, and Behavioral Finance, 49 J. FIN. ECON. 283 (1998) (arguing that long-term return
anomalies do not discount the efficiency of markets). Literature on market efficiency is extensive
and subject to a detailed and wide-ranging critique. See, e.g., ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT
MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000) (discussing the behavioral
economics critique); Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of
Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1980) (arguing that markets can never
be perfectly efficient as if they were, actors would have no incentive to trade); Lawrence H.
Summers, Does the Stock Market Rationally Reflect Fundamental Values?, 41 J. FIN. 591 (1986)
(contending that evidence supporting the efficient markets hypothesis does not preclude the
possibility that market prices are irrational). In the legal literature, see, for example, Lynn A. Stout,
The Mechanisms of Market In§/ficiency. An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635
(2003); William KS. Wang, SomeArguments That the Stock Market Is Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 341 (1986).
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worth. In pooling the collective wisdom of all traders, prices offer an unbiased
window into the present value of the future cash flows likely to derive from a set
of traded securities.
Efficient markets are most informative when they bring together a variety of
traders to transact with one another. As proposed by Ronald Gilson and Reinier
Kraakman, markets become efficient through the fluid interaction of informed,
uninformed, derivatively informed, and universally informed traders.33 In their
analysis, informed and derivatively informed traders inject new information into
markets. Informed traders possess private, market-moving information acquired
by research or special access. Their transactions-and the price at which they are
willing to trade-shift the prevailing price of a security in an efficient direction.
By contrast, derivatively informed traders simply follow, sometimes imper-
fectly, the lead set by informed traders. A derivatively informed trader deduces
how an informed trader is likely to move and undertakes a similar pattern of
trades. While a derivatively informed trader might not get the best returns from
the information-because informed traders should have already captured them-
she might be lucky enough to get a slice of the winnings. Importantly, derivative-
ly informed traders are essential to price formation. They can accelerate the pace
by which information enters markets, boosting the signaling power of the intelli-
gence of informed traders.
On the other hand, uninformed and universally informed traders supply the
market with liquidity. These actors are not sufficiently supplied with new infor-
mation to trade successfully. They may possess out-of-date information, or may
be trading without any real information at all, perhaps because they wish to im-
mediately buy or sell their securities. They provide the fodder needed to encour-
age informed and derivatively informed traders to enter the market. For one,
fundamentally informed traders will make money from trades undertaken with
uninformed or universally informed traders. More broadly, universally informed
or uninformed traders should bring a wide variety of perspectives and biases to
the market. For example, some may overreact to information, while others may
be too cautious. This heterogeneity should work to cancel out any heavy biases
that one or other group of dominant traders might have and thus to generate a
more objective price.34
33. Gilson &Kraakman, supra note 7, at 565-92.
34. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 7, at 565-92, 610-13; see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier
Kraakman, Market Efficiency After the Financial Crisis. It's Still a Matter of Information Costs (100
VA. L. REV. 313, 326-31 (2014) (noting that informational efficiency under the ECMH provides
the best way to proxy for fimdamental efficiency) [hereinafter Matter ofInformation Costs]; Ronald
J. Gilson & Reinier R. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later. The
Hindsight Bias (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies Working Paper No. 240,2003)
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The ECMH stands as a proposition for informational efficiency in mar-
kets-in other words, how well markets react o new information in prices. It
does not speak to questions of fundamental efficiency-how productively a com-
pany utilizes its capital to enhance firm value. Still, scholars posit that the
ECMH provides the most unbiased estimate as to what a company might be
worth more fundamentally. As Gilson and Kraakman suggest, information per-
taining to a firm's fundamental efficiency is likely to be available in the market.
With such intelligence scattered in the public space, its significance should come
to be reflected in the prices at which securities trade. The link between informa-
tional and fundamental efficiency is far from perfect. Not all the information re-
lating to a firm's real value may be available. And, this data might be difficult to
analyze. But it is the best guide to real value that markets have.3" This link be-
tween informational and fundamental efficiency underscores the significance of
securities trading-and the mechanics that support it-for the transfer of capital
between investors and businesses in the economy.
2. The Mechanics of Efficiency
The challenge for policymakers lies in translating the aspirations of theory
into the hard practice of market structure. If the goal of securities markets lies in
ensuring that capital can reach productive investment, information and efficiency
is central. If trading mechanics can maximize the collection and pooling of in-
formation, securities prices should provide a more accurate gauge of information-
al and fundamental value. While a fill discussion of exchange design is outside of
the scope of this Article, two key features bear noting.
Price Circulation: Markets need to be supplied with a steady flow of infor-
mation about activity on exchanges.36 Investors should be able to see current prices
and trading information in order to decide whether to act. At the most basic level,
this might extend simply to circulating the current price of securities to all traders
on the exchange. When traders can see the exact prices at which securities trade,
(analyzing this design against the critiques put forward by behavioral economists). For further
discussion and analysis, see Yadav, supra note 7.
35. See Robert F. Stambaugh, Does the Stock Market Rationally R§/Iect Fundamental Values? Discussion,
41 J. FIN. 601, 602 (1986); Matter ofInformation Costs, supra note 34, at 7-9.
36. See David Easley et al., Djferential Access to Price Information in Financial Markets, J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS (forthcoming) (manuscript at 3-6), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=1787029 (noting the significance of information for price formation in
markets). But see Giovanni Cespa & Thierry Foucault, Insiders- Outsiders, Transparency and the
Value of the Ticker (July 13, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=1117581 (arguing that the most optimal model for a market is where there
is either fidl opacity or limited transparency with a combination of insider-outsiders).
983
63 UCLA L. REV. 968 (2016)
they can determine whether these might be trading at an under or over value
based on the private reserves of information that they possess. Timely price data
allows traders to also determine demand for a particular security-helping in-
formed and derivatively informed traders to deduce the existence of hidden news
emerging into the market.
Broadly circulated price data helps support efficiency in markets. Rather
than spend money on acquiring information about current prices, a trader can
instead direct investment towards real research.3' Where heterogeneous
groups of traders face fewer transaction costs, price formation should be more
richly informed. The importance of publically available price data is reflected
in current market practice. In the U.S., all major venues that trade securities
listed on national and regional exchanges must report current quotes to the
Consolidated Tape or "ticker" that circulates a stream of price-related infor-
mation throughout the market.38 Instead of forcing individual traders to invest
in acquiring these data from multiple exchanges, the ticker does this job far
more cheaply.
Liquidity: The ability of investors to easily move in and out of their posi-
tions helps markets become better at revealing information about securities.
If traders are unable to transact when they wish, the information they can
convey by this transaction will be muted in its impact. A lack of liquidity can
harm informational as well as fundamental value efficiencies. For one, if in-
vestors cannot use information to quickly exit their investment, they must
bear the risk that their capital is locked-in for a period of time. Rationally,
traders that cannot gain ready access to their money are likely to discount for
this possibility. They should reduce the amount of capital they invest to re-
flect the risk that they cannot easily extract their capital from the market. This
calculated reduction of investment can leave productive companies receiving less
cash than they might otherwise deserve.39 Moreover, the costs of capital trapped
37. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Casefor a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70
VA. L. REV. 717, 722-37 (1984) (discussing the benefits of mandatory disclosure for avoiding
inefficiencies in information acquisition and research); see alsoMerritt B. Fox et al., Law, SharePrice
Accuracy and Economic Peformance: The Nesw Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331, 339-41 (2003)
(noting the importance of mandatory disdosure for share price efficiency). The literature in this
area is considerable. For skeptical perspectives on the value of mandatory disclosure, see, for
example, HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN
SEARCH OFA PURPOSE (1979).
38. Overvieo, CONSOLIDATED TAPE ASS'N, https://www.ctaplan.com/index [https://perma.cc/
U3NK-S55A] (last visited Mar. 7,2016).
39. For a discussion of the impact of liquidity on governance outcomes, see generally Bengt
Holmstrom &Jean Tirole, Market Liquidity and Peiformance Monitoring, 101 J. POL. ECON. 678
(1993); Yadav, supra note 7, at 33.
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in sticky investments can result in powerful disincentives for informed traders to
enter markets. If they cannot use their intelligence in a timely fashion and if pric-
es fail to reflect the product of their trading, there is little left to coax informed
traders into the marketplace.
B. Efficiency and Intermediation
To achieve the promise of efficient and liquid trading, markets have long
looked to a select cohort of institutions to support the mechanics of exchange.
These intermediaries have traditionally been formally charged by exchanges to
"make markets," matching buyers and sellers, using their own money to stabilize
and maintain trading even during periods of market stress. By dint of this role,
market makers have gained positional prominence, historically intermediating a
vast swath of trades. Despite facilitating efficiency, however, market making also
creates risks. The central role of market makers raises the possibility that they
might utilize non-public trading information for personal profit-undercutting
investors to pick off all the best trades for their own account. In response to these
structural dangers, a detailed body of law has evolved to constrain the conduct of
these key traders and to place costs on their access to and use of trading infor-
mation for private profit.
1. Making Markets
Market makers provide liquidity.40 Put simply, their job is to stand ready
to buy and sell securities using their own money, converting securities to cash
and cash to securities. To avoid the pitfalls of uneven supply and demand for
securities, market makers also stabilize order flows by selling and purchasing se-
curities to even out spikes and troughs. This means that they need to have
ready cash to buy securities from investors as well as an inventory of securities
for those looking to buy.41 In each case, market makers agree to put significant
resources on the line in the everyday performance of this task.
The risks that market makers face can grow markedly when markets face a
crisis or unexpectedly become stressed. If a listed company announces a merger
or faces bankruptcy, market makers can come under serious strain. In a crisis,
the need for securities is likely to go in one direction-either to buy or to sell
40. See generally Harold Demsetz, The Cost of Transacting, 82 QJ. ECON. 33 (1968) (detailing the
significance of liquidity for market quality).
41. See, e.g., Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 12, at 32-34 (discussing inventory management by
dealers).
985
63 UCLA L. REV. 968 (2016)
securities-requiring the market maker to stand ready to meet this demand.
In such cases, the downside risks can be extensive and difficult to quantify and
provision for ex ante. Indeed, market makers face a double bind. Not only must
they purchase securities when everyone else wishes to sell, but they can also be left
holding these distressed, sticky securities on their books. Similarly, when inves-
tors wish to buy securities because of good news, market makers must be able to
provide these from a pool of their own inventory. Outsize demand might even
force market makers to go out and buy these expensive assets from others in the
market in order to meet unexpected demand. The importance of market makers
and the inherent risks of this role mean that it has generally been performed by a
fairly small and expert group of established Wall Street institutions.42 Without
investors having confidence in the system of market making, and the quality of
the institutions providing it, the system would have little credibility.43
Exchanges vary in the intensity of market making they offer. The NYSE,
for example, has historically marketed itself as offering an expressly active form
through the intermediation of a "specialist" market maker." Specialists on the
NYSE were charged with creating a "fair and orderly" market for one or more
listed securities.45 By this designation, a specialist had a monopoly power to set
the buy and sell price for its specific securities against which all other traders could
compete. It was also the one trader responsible for maintaining liquidity in its se-
curities when no one else was willing to step in to trade. This placed the NYSE
specialist under an affirmative obligation to keep the lights on even at a high per-
sonal cost out of its own pocket. Indeed, the obligation to preserve order required
a specialist to ensure that the prices it set did not suddenly jump, even if the riski-
ness or volatility of the securities might justify a sharp rise or fall. This need for
price continuity combined with its monopoly over certain securities meant that
the specialist could end up on the hook to cover potentially enormous liability in
the marketplace. It is worth noting that in recent years, responding to the emer-
gence of automated traders competing for their business, the role of the specialist
has relaxed. The NYSE has disbanded the "specialist" model in favor of a looser
42. See DesignatedMarket Makers, supra note 11.
43. See Besessembinder et al., supra note 13 (noting the benefits of affirmative obligations on market
makers).
44. Lawrence R Glosten, Insider Trading, Liquidity, and the Role of the Monopolist Specialist, 62 J. BUS.
211,211-12 (1989).
45. NYSE Rule 104(0(ii), supra note 10.
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category of Designated Market Makers (DMMs). Unlike specialists, DMMs
are not subject to the same extensive affirmative obligations in price continuity.
46
The old specialist model, however, is only one option available to exchang-
es. Instead of working on a monopolistic design, market makers might also com-
pete with one another. The NASDAQ for example, comprises a network of
several market makers that act as intermediaries to buy and sell securities to inves-
tors. Rather than relying on a single monopolist to set the prices-as was the case
on the NYSE-the NASDAQencourages its market makers to compete with
one another. This process is designed to promote more efficient price discov-
ery.47 While these markets might aim to encourage competition between nu-
merous market makers, they do not always work that way in practice.48 Scholars
have observed that, despite a multiplicity of competing firms, one or two dealers
dominate trading for a particular stock. This can happen, for example, if they
acted as underwriters for the initial public offering, have special knowledge about
a company's industry, or if they have a history of dealing in those securities.49 In
other words, dealers with better information can often have an advantage over
others.
Finance theorists have debated the merits of monopolistic market makers
versus more competitive models."0 A discussion of these debates is outside the
scope of this Article. The key point, however, should now be clear. Securities
markets have long depended upon a small cohort of dedicated market makers for
their successful operation. This role places this group of firms at the heart of
trading and positions them to be central vectors that guide the flow of trades
throughout the market. This structural positioning, however, creates a funda-
mental regulatory conundrum. Market makers anchor modern securities mar-
kets: Their goal is to maintain the smooth liquidity of busy markets. But this
role places them in a unique position to survey the flow of trading information in
the marketplace. It raises the risk that a select set of insiders can take ad-
vantage of their access to systematically make private gains at the expense of
other investors. As discussed in Part II, market making has undergone a radical
46. See Amihud &Mendelson, supra note 12, at 32; Glosten, supra note 44, at 212-15; Bessembinder
et al., supra note 13, at 2-8. The finance literature on the advantages and disadvantages of
affirmative obligations and price continuity is extensive.
47. Ellis at al., supra note 12, at 1-6.
48. In addition, NASDAQhas been famously implicated in collusive practices between its dealers.
See, e.g., Christie &Schultz, supra note 14.
49. Ellis et al., supra note 13, at 3-6; see also Bidisha Chakrabarty, Do Dealers Infer Information From
Order Flow, 30 J. FIN. RES. 181 (2007) (noting the tendency of dealers to follow the quotes of a
"lead" dealer).
50. For a discussion of the literature, see Ellis et al., supra note 12; Bessembinder et al., supra note 13.
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transformation with the arrival of high frequency trading. Rather than rely on
designated market makers, securities makers now look to high-speed traders to
provide a more informal, functional market making by rapidly buying and sell-
ing shares with investors.1 These hi-tech market makers, however, have taken
on a role whose major advantage-namely, access to not-yet-public investor in-
formation-has been tightly regulated by both public and private regulators.
2. Investor Protection and Market Insiders
Regulators have long recognized the risks of traditional market makers tak-
ing advantage of their access to information for private gain. For one, their struc-
tural position gives rise to numerous potential permutations by which such
systematic advantage might be extracted. Take, for example, the classic case of
market makers front-running investor orders. Here, a market maker can exploit
its position to opportunistically get ahead of its clients to capture the best deals in
the market for its own gain. A simple example serves to illustrate the problem. A
Mutual Fund places an order with an NYSE specialist to buy 100,000 shares of
Public Company at a price range of between $100 and $102 per share. With the
specialist able to see incoming orders on the exchange, she thinks that the Mutual
Fund has private information about he Public Company that will raise the price
of Public Company shares. If the shares of Public Company are trading at $100
per share, the specialist might purchase these securities for herself at $100 and
only after this is done, ensure that the Mutual Fund is able to purchase its desired
allotment of shares. The market maker can buy shares for itself at $100 a share.
If it buys enough shares for itself, its action will raise the price of the security for
everyone else. Now, the market maker can sell the securities to the Mutual Fund
and the Fund must pay more for its order than it might otherwise have done. In
this way, the specialist has made money at the expense of the investor simply by
virtue of her position.2 Front running by market makers can be particularly
pernicious for investors. Not only can it result in systematic and incremental losses
to investors over time-but this loss might also act as a disincentive to informed
51. See discussion infra Part II.A.
52. For a detailed early analysis of front running and its various permutations, see Jerry Markham,
'Front-Running-" Insider Trading under the Commodities Exchange Act, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 69,
79-83 (1988) (showing examples of various types of front-running); SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963) (an early case of brokers scalping client orders);
Application of E. F. Hutton & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34-25887, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 84,
303 (July 6,1988); United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d. 163 (7th Cir. 1985).
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traders looking to maximize gains from their research and insight.5 3 Invariably,
with the potential for large, lucrative profits, exchanges have routinely faced in-
stances of front running on the trading floor.54 In one infamous incident, the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and federal prosecutors brought civil
and criminal charges against a number of elite specialist market makers on the
NYSE."5 This group stood accused of making millions by front running ex-
change orders and trading first for their own pockets rather than for their clients.
The NYSE itself also faced sanctions for its poor policing of its specialist trad-
ers.
5 6
But, front running is far from the only risk. Small groups of dealers may col-
lude with one other to quote higher prices to buy and sell securities to investors-
pocketing the extra cash for themselves. This danger may be especially live in the
world of competitive market makers-when multiple dealers are vying with each
other to capture investor attention. By fixing prices (or "spreads"), investors are
forced to internalize higher transaction costs, irrespective of whether they are in-
formed or uninformed traders. Indeed, such cartelizing effects a wealth transfer
to designated dealers without any corresponding informational gain for markets."
Regulators have placed costs on the ability of market makers to extract pri-
vate gains by virtue of their proximity to trading data. An elaborate body of regu-
lation has grown to restrict use of such information by market makers for their
own trades. Notably, exchange members are forbidden under Section 11(a) of
the Securities and Exchange Act 1934 from front running their clients' orders to
53. The literature here is vast. For a discussion on the general impact of front running on informed
traders, see Sugato Chakravarty & Asani Sarkar, Informed Trading With Multiple Competitive
Brokers (Aug. 1996) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
54. See LOUIS LOSS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION § 7-A-2 (4th ed. 2006) (detailing that an
early study by the SEC from the 1960s showed that market specialists making proprietary trades
were profitable 80 percent of the time).
55. Criminal charges were brought against 15 firms, while civil charges by the SEC were brought
against 20 firms. See Press Release, SEC Institutes Enforcement Action Against 20 Former New York
Stock Exchange Specialists Alleging Pervasive Course of Fraudulent Trading, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMMN (April 12, 2005), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-54.htm [http://perma.cc/
PZZS-5JZD]. For earlier charges against a specialist for front running violations, see Fleet
Specialist, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-49499, 82 SEC Docket 1895 (Mar. 30, 2004).
56. Specialists Stumble, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 14, 2005), http://www.economist.con/node/
3871250 [http://perma.ccZCN4-GQC2]; see also CALPERS Sues NYSE Firms, BLOOMBERG
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aUUw5xkAlkkg
[http://perma.cc/TB94-JLZC] (last visited Oct. 25, 2015); Press Release, SEC Charges The New
York Stock Exchange with Failing to Police Specialists, U.S. SEC. &EXCH. COMM'N (Apr. 12,2005),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005 -53.htm [https://perma.cc/Y4RV-5FBE].
57. Christie & Schultz, supra note 14 (the study noted that NASDAQmarket makers never quoted
spreads of 1/8th, even though those on other exchanges utilized the fil range of spreads available
for similar or the same securities).
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make personal profit on trades.58 While specialists have enjoyed an exemption
from this prohibition, Section 11's stipulations are heavily bolstered by exchange
rulemaking. In discharging their duty to effectively supervise their trading ven-
ues, exchanges prescribe detailed sets of rules to control what dealers and market
makers are permitted to do with the information they acquire. Rules 104 and 92
of the NYSE, for example, articulate a statement of the rules and responsibilities
for market makers. The NYSE's Rule 92 (now updated as Rule 5230) generally
prohibited its specialists from using information acquired in their role as market
makers to front run customer orders.5 9 Exchanges like the NASDAQ-similarly
set out detailed rules to ensure that opportunistic dealers do not purloin investor
information.60 Where dealers fail to comply, they face punishment from both ex-
changes and regulators, creating high costs of public and private sanction.
While commentators have raised doubts about the effectiveness of exchange
enforcement, evidence broadly suggests that these rules work. Finance theory
and empirical scholarship observes that market makers behave, on average, like
uninformed traders. As articulated in their seminal work, Lawrence Glosten and
Paul Milgrom observe that market makers are primed to lose out to informed
traders.61 Despite their structural advantages, market makers suffer systematic
adverse selection costs against informed traders. In other words, rather than in-
vestors losing to the all-seeing market maker, it is the market maker that general-
ly loses money to the informed trader.62 For example, when NASDAQ-market
makers were caught in a scheme of tacit collusion, as discussed above, they were
forced to undergo thoroughgoing reform of their practices to eliminate the artifi-
cially high spreads. Post-reform, a study of NASDAQ-spreads showed that,
58. 17 C.F.R. § 240.11a-1 (2008). It should be noted that specialists are generally exempt from this
prohibition.
59. NYSE Rule 92 (2003), http://nysenles.nyse.com/nyse/nles/nyse-nles/chp 1 3/chp 1 3 6/
default.asp [http://perma.cc/7-2B8UL]. NYSE's Rule 92 has since been repealed and
replaced by Rule 5230. Rule 5320 reflects HNRA's prohibition against front running, as
articulated by HNRA Rule 5320 (the Manning Rule). PINRA Regulatory Notice 11-24 (May
2011); ELIZABETH M. MURPHY, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, RELEASE No. 34-65164, (2011),
http://www.sec.gov/nles/sro/nyse/2011/34-65164.pdf [perma.cc/T33R-MCK5].
60. Equity Rules, NASDAQ_ (une 19, 2014), http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/nasdaq/main/
nasdaq-equtityrules/chp 1 1/default.asp [http://web.archive.org/web/20160308060232/http://
nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/nasdaq/main/nasdaq-equityrules/chp 1-1/default.asp].
61. Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Big Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market
With Heterogeneously Informed Traders, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 71, 72-75 (1985); see also David Easley &
Maureen O'Hara, Price, Trade Size, and Information in Securities Markets, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 69
(1987). On adverse selection in general, see George A. Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 QJ. ECON. 488 (1970).
62. The literature on this issue is vast. Historically, scholars have noted that the adverse selection
problem is generally less pronounced in the case of the old NYSE specialist with ftll sight of the
order bool For discussion and analysis, see Bessembinder et al., supra note 13.
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while the spreads had (obviously) fallen in response to reform efforts, the greatest
decrease was for spreads in low-volume stocks. Because such stocks saw relative-
ly less trading, those that did trade were likely to do so when they had meaning-
ful private information. The steeper fall in spreads for low-volume stock sug-
suggested that NASDAQ dealers might have been especially vulnerable to the
adverse selection costs created by informed dealings in such securities and
charged much more to compensate for this risk.63
Indeed, this asymmetry in the relative positions of the informed trader and
market maker constitutes the central dilemma of market making.64 Knowing
they are going to lose against the informed traders, market makers must compen-
sate themselves for these losses and creatively mitigate the risks they confront (for
example, by charging higher spreads or by tightly managing their inventory of se-
curities).6"
In summary, our securities markets have historically depended on a small
cohort of market makers for their smooth functioning-to always provide li-
quidity in good times and bad. Without their intervention, markets are left vul-
nerable to periodic shocks of supply and demand that can distort pricing and
create entry and exit costs for investors. While market makers have gained posi-
tional privilege in markets-having been historically relied upon to intermediate
trades as specialists or dealers-they have also been heavily regulated. Policymakers
have struck a delicate bargain, recognizing the central position of market makers
but also placing costs on their ability to use trading information for private gain.
This balance broadly reflects a recognized allocation of information costs be-
tween market insiders-the market makers-and investors at large. Regulation
has sought to protect investor information from being systematically undercut by
structural insiders, leaving these insiders to internalize the costs of protecting
themselves against more informed investors.
63. Michael J. Barclay et al., Effects of Market Reform on the Trading Costs and Depths of NASDAQ
Stocks, 54 J. FIN. 1 (1999); see also Bruno Biais et al., Imperfect Competition in Financial Markets.
ISLANID vs NASDAQ (Nov. 26, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), http://repository.cmu.edu/
tepper/478/.
64. Robert B. Thompson, Market Makers and Vampire Squid: Regulating Securities Markets After the
Financial Meltdown (Georgetown Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 11-21, 2011),
http://scholarsbip.law.georgetown.edu/fwps papers/150/ (analyzing the conflicts underlying
investment banks as market makers for swaps trading during the Financial Crisis and the impact of
the Dodd-FrankAct on traditional regulatory paradigms in market making).
65. Lawrence R. Glosten & Lawrence E. Harris, Estimating the Components of the Bid/Ask Spread, 21 J.
FIN. ECON. 123, 126-28 (1987). See also James F. Gammill, Jr., Financial Market Design Wen
Traders Have Private Information (Graduate Sch. of Bus. Admin. Working Paper Series No.
CSFM-123,1986).
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II. THE MODERN INTERMEDIARY
This Part analyzes the emergence of high frequency trading (HFT). Tradi-
tional market makers have ceded ground to high-speed electronic traders that
fulfill the basic economic functions of a market maker without being burdened by
the fill panoply of legal duties that accompany the designation.66 As markets
have grown ever more reliant on ultra-fast traders to provide liquidity, the long-
held allocation of information costs between market makers and investors has
been radically transformed. Combining speed, physical access, and superior in-
formation from exchanges, a select cohort of HFT market makers have acquired
a prize position from which to view not-filly-public information and to utilize
this special access for private profit.
A. Economic Market Making
1. Algorithmic Trading
Algorithmic trading refers to the use of algorithms-or preprogrammed
electronic instructions-to undertake nearly all parts of the trading process.
67
Rather than rely on human beings to follow a strategy, submit orders, route them
to the best exchanges, and to execute trades, traders can instead program algo-
rithms to complete these tasks. With computers on the frontlines, trades can
progress rapidly, deploy complex data and transact enormous volumes of securi-
ties across multiple exchanges accurately and profitably.
Algorithmic trading includes a subset of extremely rapid, high-volume se-
curities dealing-high frequency trading-characterized by traders buying and
selling securities in milliseconds and microseconds. While there remains no clear
definition of HFT, the SEC has proposed some key features that serve to broadly
distinguish HFT traders from other algorithmic actors. For example, HFT firms
are usually proprietary firms that trade for themselves and use their own money.
Rather than make trades for clients, as traditional dealers have done, HFT firms
transact to make money for their own purse. Without clients to look after, HET
traders have far fewer regulatory constraints (with respect, for example, to front
running) and can pursue their own strategies. In addition to being proprietary
66. GOV'T OFFICE FOR SC., FORESIGHT: THE FUTURE OF COMPUTER TRADING IN
FINANCIAL MARKETS: FINAL PROJECT REPORT 20-50 (2012) (discussing the rise of
automated trading in a variety of trading strategies).
67. See supra note 16.
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firms, HFT traders show rapid turnover of securities, locate at or near exchanges,
and usually end the day without any open positions.68 HET firms are specialized
trading firms rather than household names-they include Virtu Financial, Teza
Technologies, Jump Trading, and Tower Research, all relative newcomers not
part of Wall Street's old guard.69
HFT has become a dominant paradigm in securities trading. By some es-
timates, HET is responsible for around 50 to 70 percent of all equities trading by
volume. ° In the futures market, for example, studies uggest hat around 60 per-
cent of trading by volume is driven by HFT.71 Using HFT, securities trade at
speeds measured in milliseconds and microseconds, with traders able to enter and
exit their positions in tiny intervals of time.72 At this tempo, engaging in human
decision making is impossible. HET traders necessarily depend on sophisticated
algorithms for their operations.73
Market Making: HFT is especially conducive to a more informal economic
market making.74 Traditionally, designated market makers stand ready to buy
and sell securities using their own money in an effort to ensure that investors face
low transaction costs. Algorithmic traders fulfill the economic function of mar-
ket making by harnessing speed, high-volume trading, and data analysis to make
a market, rather than being formally contracted to do so by an exchange. HET
market makers thus represent "ordinary" traders that supply a market making ser-
vice by virtue of their speed and willingness to transact with investors, rather than
contracted-for specialists or designated market makers traditional to the NYSE
and the NASDAQ75
68. SEC LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 18, at 4-5.
69. See generally Gregory Laughlin, Insights Into High Frequency Trading From the Virtu Initial Public
Offering, 2-4 (Ctr. for Analytical Fin., Univ. of Cal. Santa Cruz, Working Paper No. 11, 2014),
http://cafm.ucsc.edu/research/work papers/CAFIN WP11.pdf[https://perma.cc/HZA6-FJ5E].
70. Michael Mackenzie, High Frequency Trading Under Scrutiny, FIN. TIMES (uly 28, 2009, 6:44
PM), http://www.ft.com/ind/cms/s/O/d5faO660-7b95-llde-9772-OO144feabdcO.html#axzz3z
4mlhlGI [perma.cc/8J7G-US6H] (pointing to a study providing that HFT is 73 percent of
American daily equity volume). These figures can vary between studies and are difficult to
determine definitively. For a wide review of the studies, see SEC LITERATURE REVIEW, supra
note 18, at 4-7.
71. See, e.g., Macintosh, supra note 1.
72. SEC LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 18, at 4; David Easley et al., The Volume Clock: Insights
Into the High-Frequency Paradigm, 39 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 19 (2012) (noting the importance of
volume as well as speed trading in HFT).
73. SEC LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 18, at 4.
74. Madntosh, supra note 1, at 4-5.
75. See Menkveld, supra note 18.
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HFT traders submit orders to buy and sell securities, usually trading for
themselves using their own money.76 Instead of holding onto securities for days
or hours, HET traders enter and exit positions in milliseconds or less. By capi-
talizing on the speed and rapid turnover of trades, HET firms can perform
hundreds of thousands of trades in a day and act as willing and available trading
partners for investors. Rather than waiting for old-style market makers to
match buyers and sellers, HET firms offer an immediate deal, reducing search
costs and execution uncertainty for investors."
The HFT market-making model offers a multiplicity of benefits. Firms
can make sure to steady profits by undertaking large volumes of trades over a
day-taking a tiny slice of profit from each one. For example, Virtu Financial,
a prominent HFT firm, is reported to transact in around 160 million shares
per day across 800,000 trades, with an average profit of around $0.0027 per
share ($440 thousand per day for equities trading). Indeed, Virtu's business
model has been so successful that it has lost money on only one out of 1278 trad-
ing days-likely attributable to technological error, rather than a bad day of un-
profitable trades.7' Taken together, predictable and accretive gains are made even
more attractive given the attenuated risks assumed by the ultra fast algorithmic
trader. Rather than face prolonged exposure by keeping securities on their books
for an extended period of time, as old-style market makers may have done, the
exposure HFT traders face is fleeting. With these momentary exposures to se-
curities, firms do not have to invest in deeply researching their fundamental,
future performance, but only how prices might shift in the very short term.
And, without affirmative contractual obligations to remain on the market,
HFT firms do not have to plan for the possibility they might be called upon to
remain on the exchange in times of trouble. If crisis hits, such firms can and
do leave-and return only when market conditions are more forgiving.79 With
76. SEC LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 18, at 4.
77. See Jonathan Brogaard et al., High Frequency Trading and Price Discovery (Eur. Cent. Bank
Working Paper Series No. 1602,2013); Menkveld, supra note 18; Easley et al., supra note 72.
78. Laughlin, supra note 69. Virtu trades across many markets, not just those for equities. It is
estimated that Virtu probably performs around 2.5-3 million trades across all asset classes.
Laughlin estimates that Virtu is responsible for between 3-5 percent of the volume of equities
trading in the U.S. See also Virtu Financial, Form S-1, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Mar. 10,
2014), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1592386/000104746914002070/a2218589zs-
1.htm [https://perma.cc/UP74-EJQD]. For discussion of HFT profits using bid-ask spreads and
cross-market strategies, see Menkveld, supra note 18.
79. Vikas Raman et al., Man vs. Machine: Li uidity Supply and Market Fragility (2015) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ifrogs.org/PDF/CONF 2015/Ramann Robe Yadav 2015.pdf
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a cheap exit option, informal HET market makers need to invest even less in
value-relevant research.0
HET has proven popular with exchanges and trading platforms. For a start,
as the example of Virtu Financial indicates, rapid-fire algorithmic trading repre-
sents a volume driven business.1 Bringing millions of trades per day to the mar-
ketplace, HET generates sizable boosts in revenue for exchanges on account of
the fees paid by traders.8 2 More fundamentally, scholars speak to an improve-
ment in market quality and lower transaction costs for investors." Liquidity
seems abundant and immediate. Indeed, with algorithmic market makers facing
fewer risks, spreads have fallen. Based on one study examining the impact of the
"new market makers," Professor Menkveld highlighted an almost 50 percent
drop in spreads with the arrival of an HFT on an exchange.4
Given the benefits that HFT has brought for exchanges and some
measures of market quality, HET traders enjoy access to structural advantages in
the marketplace that have, in practice, yielded unprecedented informational d-
vantages. In particular, HET traders benefit from: (i) physical proximity to ex-
changes; (ii) rich data feeds of exchange activities; and (iii) programming that
enables instant reaction to new information. Together, these essential attributes
of HET allow certain HET firms to have preferential access to information, to
trade on it, and to change prices before the information reaches the broader mar-
ket. In past iterations of market making, regulation and markets sought to create
a separation between providing liquidity and private information trading. The
arrival of HFT blurs this distinction irreversibly.
80. Andrei Kirilenko et al., The Flash Crash: The Impact of High Freuency Trading on an Electronic
Market (Dec. 28, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.conr/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=1686004.
81. Friends Without Benefits, NANEX RESEARCH (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.nanex.net/aqck2/3528.
html [http://perma.cc/U74W-EN3X] (noting that traders were submitting around 460 times
more quotes for trades in 2012 than in 2000). For discussion, see Yadav, Algorithmic Trading, supra
note 7; see also Easley et al., supra note 72.
82. Scott Patterson & Andrew Ackerman, Regulators Weigh Curbs on Trading Fees SEC Officials
Consider Testing Maker-Taker' Plans, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 14, 2014) 7:04 PM ET,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 10001424052702303887804579501881218287694
[https://perma.cc/NE2J-78G2] (noting the fee structure of exchanges and discussing debates for
reform).
83. Brogaard et al., supra note 77; SEC LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 18, at 4-6. Butsee Yadav,
supra note 7; Zhang, supra note 18 (on the transient and poor quality of liquidity offered by HFT).
84. See Menkveld, supra note 18. But see Yadav, supra note 7; Zhang, supra note 147 (discussing the
low quality of the liquidity created by HFF). It is also worth noting that HFF liquidity can
evaporate in times of market stress. See STAFFS OFTHE CFI9C &SEC, FINDINGS REGARDING
THE EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010 45 (2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/marketevents-
report.pdf [perma.cc/P9PK-FX3QJ. For a filler discussion of the literature and the problems for
efficiency, fundamental traders, and regulation created by HFT, see Yadav, supra note 7.
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2. Physical Proximity
The ability of traders to physically place their computer servers next to those
of an exchange constitutes a critically important means of facilitating HET. In-
deed, the SEC identifies co-location as a key feature of HFT.85 As speed is es-
sential, HET is ultimately constrained by geography. If a firm's orders must
travel long or looping distances to reach an exchange, it faces a problem vis-A-vis
competitors situated closer to the market. Distances delay the arrival of a trader's
orders. They also increase the time it takes for traders to receive information
from the exchange.86
Co-location describes the practice of exchanges offering trading firms phys-
ical proximity to exchange order-matching engines. This means that an ex-
change allows trading firms to situate their servers in the exchange building or in
data centers that are owned and operated by the exchange and where the ex-
change houses its own servers.8 This proximity brings significant advantages.
Because of co-location, a trader might reduce its execution time by one millisec-
ond-the time it would generally take for its order to travel 100 miles." With
greater proximity, a trader can capture the best available offering price for Public
Company shares because its order gets to the exchange matching engines faster
than those of an outsider-competitor. The incremental advantage of just a milli-
second can prove extremely lucrative for traders over time. Commentators from
85. SEC LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 18, at 4-6; see also Michael J. Aitken et al., Trade Size,
High Frequency Trading, and Co-Location Around the World (Working Paper, 2014) (noting that the
arrival of HFT traders motivates exchanges to offer colocation services).
86. See, e.g., Jerry Adler, Raging Bulls: How Wall Street Got Addicted to Light-Speed Trading, WIRED
MAGAZINE (Aug. 3, 2012, 5:33 PM), http://www.wired.com/2012/08/ff wallstreet trading
[http://perma.cc/2JSK-PZ3R]; Scott Patterson, High-Speed Stock Traders Turn to Laser Beams,
Wall St. J. (Feb. 11, 2014, 11:00 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001
424052702303947904579340711424615716 [perma.cc/PKX4-NUYB]; Matthew Phillips, My
Laser is Faster Than Your Laser, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/
bw/artides/2012-04-23/high-speed-trading-my-laser-is-faster-than-your-laser [http://perma.cc/
4T9B-VCHC]. Notable examples have included the construction of a $300 million transatlantic
fiber-optic cable to connect markets in London and New York, primed to shave 5.2 milliseconds
off the time it takes an order to travel from London to New York and back. Id. To reduce the
execution time for trades between New York and Chicago, HFT firms have backed the creation of
a new cable between the cities, designed to reduce the round-trip trading time by around 3
milliseconds. Adler, supra. By one estimate, trading firms spent around $2.2 billion in 2010 on
trading infrastructure. Id.
87. See, e.g., Co-Location Services, EUREX, http://www.eurexchange.com/exchange-en/technology/co-
location-services [http://perma.cc/BYJ3-GTWLJ] (last visited Mar. 7, 2016) ("Co-location
hosting means that exchange participants trading applications are located in the same data center as
Eurex Exchange's matching engines.").
88. Lexicon: D~fnition of Colocation, FIN. TIMES, http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=co location
[http://perma.cc/TLR6-VKEU] (last visited Mar. 7,2016).
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the market research firm TabbFORUM estimate that just one millisecond of ad-
vantage in trading can translate into $100 million of benefit to a trader over the
year.9 In the absence of co-location, such tiny, incremental slivers of gain would
be impossible to realize without significant private investment in trading infra-
structure to boost transmission speeds.
Co-location also represents a boon for exchanges, bringing financial as well
as reputational gain to the extent it contributes to boosting exchange profitability.
Major exchanges realize sizable financial gains by charging HET firms co-
location fees.9" Recent years have seen the major national exchanges buy up and
move trading operations to large data hubs capable of housing volumes of co-
located servers to cope with the demand. In 2010, for example, the NYSE
moved its matching engines to a 400,000 square foot data center in Mahwah,
New Jersey, and began shifting trading in some stocks from New York City to
Mahwah. Co-location rights in the NYSE's facilities sold out quickly, prompt-
ing calls for the NYSE to further expand these data centers.91 Traders usually
transact on multiple markets and submit orders to many exchanges at once. This
means that they often seek out opportunities for strategic co-location close to the
matching engines of several exchanges. For example, with the NYSE housing its
data center in Mahwah (north New Jersey) and the NASDAQ_ locating its
matching engines in Carteret (south New Jersey), traders routinely seek to trade
from Secaucus, a geographical midpoint between the two data centers. With the
significance of such multimarket trading, exchanges and their data centers also
offer high-end communication services between trading hubs, charging fees for
use of this sophisticated infrastructure.92
From the regulatory standpoint, co-location has faced few meaningful con-
straints." Exchanges must ensure that the terms on which they offer co-
location services are brought to the SEC for review and are in compliance with
core exchange rules and applicable securities laws. Under the Securities and Ex-
change Act 1934, exchange services must be made available to traders in a man-
ner that does not discriminate between them, harm investors, or disturb the
89. Ted Oberhaus, High Frequency Trading: The Colocation Advantage, TABB FORUM (May 23, 2014),
http://tabbforum.com/opinions/high- frequency-trading-the-co-location- advantage
[http://perma.cc/MC4W- QF4W].
90. See, e.g., NYSE EURONEXT, ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K) 8, 41,66 (Dec. 2012).
91. Rich Miller, NYSE Opens Malrwah Data Center, DATA CENTER KNOWLEDGE (Aug. 9, 2010),
http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/2010/08/09/nyse-opens-mahwah-data-center
[http://perma.cc/DS2W-2HYY]. See also Can We Get Closer. What's Next in Co-Location?,
MARKETS MEDIA (June 22, 2012), http://marketsmedia.con/closer-whats-co-location
[http://perma.cc/S2ZQ-ZAZH].
92. See Can We Get Closer: Whats Next in Co-Location?, supra note 91.
93. See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 19(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1) (2012).
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operation of a free and open market.94 Any fees and dues should be shared be-
tween an exchange's members and users of its facilities in a reasonable manner."
Besides these overarching stipulations, co-location has not come under deeper,
more searching scrutiny.96 While the SEC fined the NYSE for its failure to
provide co-location services on an equitable basis, it did so without interrogating
the actual place and existence of co-location in the market.97
3. Access to Information
Traders of all stripes can subscribe to detailed data feeds from exchanges
that provide deeper and faster access to trading information. HFT traders-
owing to co-location-can see this information, trade on it, and change prices
before this information reaches the wider market.98
The NBBO: Current regulation tilts the balance to allow HFTs to receive
fast feeds of data directly from exchanges. By law, exchanges must compete to
deliver the best price for listed securities and display this price publically for the
market. The policy goal is straightforward: Investors should be able to trade at
the best displayed price in the National Market System (NMS) or the combined
network of competing public exchanges in the U.S.99 To achieve this best dis-
played price-known as the National Best Bid Offer (NBBO) price for any se-
curity-exchanges must regularly submit their best quotes into a single
repository-Securities Information Processor or SIP-designed to consolidate
this information from the exchanges, to aggregate the various quotes, and deliver
the best NBBO for the market. The SIP ensures that the NMS is continually
94. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 6(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
95. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 6(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4).
96. See, e.g., KEVIN M. O'NEILL, SEC. & EXCH. COMMN, Release No. 34-67666, Self-Regulatory
Organizations; New York Stock Exchange LLC; Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change
Amending the New York Stock Exchange Price List to Provide for Additional Colocation Services
and Establish Related Fees (Aug. 15,2012).
97. Press Release, SEC Charges NYSE, NYSEAR CA, and NYSE MKTfor Repeated Failures to Operate
in Accordance With Exchange Rules, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (May 1, 2014),
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370541706507
[http://perma.cc/Z2S5-N7Q6]. It should be noted that the SEC requested comments on the
costs and benefits of co-location as well as on its fairness for markets in 2010, but has not taken
fiirther action since its request. See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Concept Release on Equity Market
Structure, Release No. 34-61358, 59-60 (Feb. 2010).
98. Gary Stone, SIP vs. Threct Feeds Latency: What Are the Rules?, BLOOMBERG TRADEBOOK (May
15, 2014), http://www.bloombergtradebookcont/blog/sip -vs -direct -feeds -latency- nles
[https://perma.cc/M4BQ-F6UD] (noting that co-location allows SIP information to reach co-
located actors faster).
99. Regulation National Market System Rule 600, 17 C.F.R. § 242.600 (2010); Regulation National
Market System Rule 611,17 C.F.R. § 242.611 (2010).
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generating a best national price or NBBO for investors and maintaining a clear
benchmark to safeguard investors from being short-changed by opportunists.00
While a laudable end, the process of generating the NBBO also creates in-
formational deficits and processing costs. First, it builds delay into the system.
Information must be submitted to the SIP, which consolidates all the data and
generates an output for consumption by the market. This takes time. The delay
is significant. In the milliseconds it takes for the SIP to deliver its display price,
HFT trades occur and prices are impacted. As such, by the time the SIP reacts
with a price, its read of the market is already long out of date.
Secondly, the information that exchanges must supply to generate the
NBBO-their best quotes to buy and sell a security-is only thinly informative.
To get a fuller picture, more detail is desirable, particularly to understand the
deeper demand for a security, the size of orders, who is trading, and their strate-
gies.
101
The Demandfor More Information: Inevitably, delays involved in generating
the SIP, as well as gaps in the data comprising it, generate demand for more
comprehensive and faster data. With trading occurring in microseconds, even
small delays in generating the NBBO are significant. For those traders that
thrive on exploiting small, flitting price discrepancies at high speeds, trading on
the NBBO alone is not gainful.
Exchanges, alongside a host of data collection specialists, have responded by
selling subscriptions to "direct feeds" that connect an exchange with servers be-
longing to traders. These feeds are proprietary to individual exchanges and usual-
ly come with an expensive price tag.102
Direct feeds bring considerable benefits for all traders that receive them-
but especially for those that are physically co-located with an exchange. Rather
than relying on the SIP to collect and consolidate data to deliver a market-wide
NBBO, traders can complete this task themselves. By gathering data from the
different exchanges, parsing it, and estimating their own NBBO, traders may
100. There are two main SIPs, one providing the NBBO for stocks listed on the NASDAQ-and
another providing the NBBO for stocks listed on the NYSE. For discussion, see Shengwei Ding et
al., How Slow is the NBBO?,A Comparison with Direct Exchange Feeds, 49 FIN. REV. 313, 315-17
(2014) (comparing the impact ofdelays in receiving information from the SIPs vs. direct feeds).
101. For instance, until December 2013, orders for fewer than 100 shares were excluded from the data
reported to the SIP. However, as Professor O'Hara et al. observed, even small orders are critical for
price discovery, making their exclusion detrimental to price discovery. See Maureen O'Hara et al.,
Whats Not There: The Odd-Lot Bias in TAQ Data Johnson Sch. Research Paper Series No. 31-
2011, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1892972; Trade Reporting
Frequently Asked Questions, HNRA, http://www.fimra.org/Industry/Regulation/Gidance/
P038942 [http://perma.cc/9TBD-QSBF] (last visited Mar. 7,2016).
102. Stone, supra note 98.
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be able to calibrate a more exact benchmark privately. Individual traders can al-
so develop a more detailed picture of market activity. Data included in direct
feeds is often much richer than the information provided to the SIP. Instead of
just offering data on best and last quotes, proprietary direct feeds are often
much more detailed, including information about various order types and their
size.1"3 Exchanges might offer traders a menu of options, giving them a choice
of subscription feeds that vary in the depth and detail that they provide.1"4
Traders can also buy raw data from exchanges, that is, data that emerges fresh
from exchanges and has not gone through the cleaning and collation liable to
add micro-delays to information delivery."' These raw feeds are designed to
convey information at ultra-fast speed and to cater especially to those traders
that rely on rapid-fire information flows to make money.
Regulation requires exchanges to provide broad access to their data. As
centerpieces of the markefts infrastructure, exchanges must provide information
to all investors in a manner that is fair and nondiscriminatory.1"6 The reach of
this obligation, however, is carefully drawn. It emphasizes that exchanges must
submit their data to a SIP or a data feed in a manner that does not discriminate
between investors. It does not require that exchanges check that traders all re-
ceive this information at the same time. Indeed, the SEC only mandates that ex-
changes supply data to a SIP and to direct feeds simultaneously, which doesn't
take into account the delays associated with the SIP process in getting the infor-
mation to investors. As shown in Appendix 1, this leaves exchanges able to offer
direct feeds to subscribers, so long as they provide data to SIP and to the proprie-
tary feed simultaneously. Otherwise, the disparity in the speed and content of di-
rect feeds versus information emerging through the SIP poses little by way of
regulatory concern.1"'
103. Ding et al., supra note 100, at 1-2.
104. See, e.g., Overies, NASDAQ http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/trader.aspx?id=dpspecs
[http://perma.cc/2EUQ-C2NL] (last visited Mar. 7,2016).
105. See, e.g., INTERACTIVE DATA, ULTRA-Low LATENCY DIRECT DATA FEEDS,
http://www.interactivedata.com/uploads/File/2010-Q4/rts/Direct%2OData%/2OFeeds.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9R9W-27"7E].
106. Regulation National Market System Rule 603,17 C.F.R. § 242.603 (2010).
107. Stone, supra note 98. Regulation National Market System Rule 603(a), 17 C.F.R. § 242.603(a)
(2010).
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4. Programming
Importantly, to trade in microseconds, HET algorithms must be in a posi-
tion to harness this programming to trade independently in real time.0 8 Human
programmers cannot control the trade-by-trade decisionmaking of HET algo-
rithms, nor can they dictate the exact responses of algorithms to changing market
conditions. As Michael Kearns and Yuriy Nevmyvaka note, HET algorithms
can also be sophisticated enough to learn from their successes and failures and to
anticipate the future impact of their own trading. 9 This means that algorithms
will collect information, collate and analyze it, and arrive at a reaction by submit-
ting orders into the marketplace-all without the intervention of their human
programmers. If their trades incur a loss, the algorithms might adjust their next
moves, limit, or even stop trading. This entire process generally occurs in mil-
lionths of a second. At this volume and tempo, there is little scope for slower
traders to view market activity in real time.1
The point is simply this. HFT algorithms are programmed to receive and
trade on data as soon as they receive it. In combination with co-location and data
feeds, automated analysis and response brings significant structural advantage.
HFT algorithms can see data first-by virtue of co-location and direct feeds-
and transact on this information instantaneously. As Appendix 1 shows, by the
time information reaches the wider market, co-located HFTs have traded on it
and rendered it obsolete.
B. Summary
Markets have undergone a sea change in how they generate efficiencies.
Rather than rely on a small cohort of institutions to maintain liquidity, modern
markets depend on a group of high-speed trading firms for volume, liquidity, and
108. IRENE ALDRIDGE, HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ALGORITHMIC
STRATEGIES AND TRADING SYSTEMS 20-31 (2010); RISHI NARANG, INSIDE THE BLACK
Box: A SIMPLE GUIDE TO QUANTITATIVE AND HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING 24-62 (2d
ed. 2013); Christian Dunis et al., Optimising Intraday Trading Models With Genetic Algorithms,
https://web.archive.org/web/20130418122919/http://www.1jmu.ac.uk/afe/afe docs/cibef0499.
pdf For examples of some common basic models for trading, see Sham M. Kakade et al.,
Competitive Algorithms for VVAP and Limit Order Trading (2004) (unpublished manuscript),
https://www.cis.upenn.edu/-mkearns/papers/vwap.pdf [ erma.cc/PSW6-NRS8].
109. Michael Kearns & Yuriy Nevmyvaka, Machine Learning for Market Microstructure and High
Frequency Trading, in HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING - NEW REALITIES FOR TRADERS,
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investor participation. In fulfilling this market making function, HFT traders
enjoy first access to trading information that enables them to see market infor-
mation first and to change prices before information reaches the wider market.
Reflecting this transition, current market structure institutionalizes an en-
tirely new allocation of information costs for market makers. Seen historically,
the positional power of dealers over markets gave rise to a system of rules and reg-
ulations that placed costs on their attempts to extract information for private ad-
vantage. While far from airtight-given the numerous violations that have taken
place over the years-regulation sought to instill parity of bargaining power be-
tween everyday investors and the small coterie of dealers that intermediated their
trades.
Today, the landscape looks very different. Algorithmic traders-trading
largely for themselves-exercise systematically superior structural access to ex-
change information. By a combination of physical proximity, rich data feeds, and
instantaneous algorithmic reaction to emerging news, HFT traders can receive
and react o information ahead of investors that lack these tools. Seen from the
point of view of market design, HFT traders increasingly appear to form a class of
structural insiders with real access to information and an outsized ability to affect
price formation on modem exchanges.
III. INSIDERTRADING LAWAND POLICY
The prohibition against insider trading powerfully governs the flow of in-
formation in securities markets.111 In its doctrinal design, it imposes hard con-
straints on the ability of various insiders to transact in the information that they
possess. Broadly, doctrine rests on the theory that insiders with private stores of
non-public information pose a risk to the rest of the market and to investors at
large. If insiders are able to trade freely, they will win systematically and leave
others to face repeated losses over time. From the markefts perspective, theory
suggests, the risk of harm is particularly substantial. With one set of investors en-
riched by the simple fact of their insider status, others should be rationally incen-
tivized to leave, taking their money and insights elsewhere and diminishing the
111. See Preet Bharara' Key Insider Tradinjf Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6,2015), http://www.nytimes.com
/interactive/2014/07/9/business/dealbook/09insider-timeline.htnil? r=0#/#time337 8872
rhttp://perma.cc/M\D7S-GQ3K] (noting that the U.S. District Attorney for the Southern District
of New York has secured 85 puiltv pleas and convictions between March 2010 and December
2014); see also SEC Enforcement Actions: Insider Trading Cases, U.S. SEC, & EXCH. COMM'N,
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/insidertradinR/cases.shtml [http://perma.cc/G3B2 -FJHS]
[hereinafter SEC ENFORCEMENT CASES].
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power of capital markets.112 While doctrine remains notoriously undear in its
application-and indeed conflicted in parts13-the social and economic harms
targeted by the prohibition speak to core interests in information accessibility.14
This Part examines the basic rationales that have conventionally justified
the founding tenets of the doctrine: (i) investor protection; (ii) equal access and
fairness; and (iii) supporting capital markets. It outlines the central harms tar-
geted by law and policy, and examines the tension the prohibition creates for
market efficiency. Importantly, despite controversies, the theory and policy of
insider trading provide an understanding of how policy regulates access to confi-
dential information in securities markets. By setting limits on who can use con-
fidential information to trade, theory identifies and seeks to control economic
harms that might arise if confidential information is unprotected or otherwise
regulated by private contract. As discussed below, theory has supported the ap-
plication of insider trading laws to protect investors, encourage fair and equal ac-
cess to information and improve market quality. In doing so, it identifies a set
of core harms that can arise from trading on confidential information: the sys-
tematic erosion of investor interests by those with access to confidential infor-
mation; pervasive inequality of access between those with access to secret
information and others; and loss of investor confidence in markets where such
confidential information is left unguarded. This statement of harms, as out-
lined below, provides a useful framework to analyze the architecture of markets
and whether the allocation of informational access in these markets is in tension
with the theory and policy of corporate insider trading. This analysis sets the
groundwork for examining the application of these rationales to market struc-
ture and the emergence of a class of structural insiders under HFT.
A. Primer on Doctrine
The law and policy of insider trading is notoriously complex and deeply
contested. A full discussion of these debates is outside the scope of this Article.
Still, the basic structure of the law is well understood.1
112. The literature in this area is vast and a detailed discussion is outside the scope of this Article. For a
review of the debates, see Yadav, supra note 9. For an excellent discussion of the key pillars of
doctrine and policy and theoretical debates underlying insider trading, see JOHNATHAN R.
MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS AND POLICY (1991); LANGEVOORT,
supra note 2; WANG &STEINBERG, supra note 2.
113. See e.g., United States v. Newman 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014); SEC v. Dorozhko 574 F.3d 42 (2d
Cir. 2009). For wide-ranging commentary, see Beylin, supra note 5.
114. See sources supra note 7.
115. This account draws on my artide, Yadav, supra note 9, at 390-97.
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At its core, the prohibition against insider trading aims to stop select indi-
viduals-those who enjoy special access to confidential corporate information-
from trading secretly on this intelligence. The policy looks to safeguard investors,
broadly understood. By promoting investor interests, it also seeks to encourage
active and liquid markets that bring all types of investor to the trading floor. 16
The intuitive appeal of these justifying rationales has long masked the chal-
lenge of translating them into workable doctrine. Part of this difficulty lies in the
decision to situate the prohibition within the general fraud section of the 1934
Exchange Act and its Rule 10b-5117 By grounding the prohibition in the doc-
trine against fraud, determining questions of liability has required showing some
form of deception on the part of the insider-trader.118 Liability now largely rests
on three basic grounds under Rule 10b-5 and Regulation Fair Disdosure. 9
Classical Theory: The classical theory of insider trading liability targets the
paradigmatic case of a privileged cohort of informed insiders using this advantage
to trade. Its focus lies in catching the managers and officers of a company that
trade in that company's stock using confidential insider knowledge. When insid-
ers trade, the losers are shareholders-both current and future investors in the
company who miss out on favorable trading opportunities or are left holding
worthless securities. The winners are those that are classically viewed as custodi-
ans of shareholder capital.20 Following the decision in Chiarella v. United
States, the law punishes defendants hat owe a fiduciary duty of trust and protec-
tion, but breach this duty through insider-trading.21 The concept of fiduciary
duty plays a critical role in crafting liability for insider trading. Insider officer-
managers that are subject to this duty must first tell shareholders of their inten-
tion to trade on confidential information. Otherwise, they cannot trade. This
116. Merrill Lynch, 43 S.E.C. 933, 936-38 (1968) (laws prevent the "inherent unfairness involved
where one takes advantage of information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and
not for the personal benefit of anyone"). But see Goshen & Parchomovksy, supra note 7 (arguing
that the main goal of securities regulation is to promote a market in information); see also Arturo
Bris, Do Insider Trading Laws Work? (Yale Int'l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 00-19, 2000)
(noting the profitability of insider trading for corporate executives).
117. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). For an earlier decision placing insider trading
within anti-fraud canon, see Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
118. MACEY, supra note 112, at 3-7.
119. Technically, there are probably four major grounds for liability. In particular, the law also regulates
trading on material information in the context of tender offers under Exchange Act Rule 14e-3,
which arises in the specific context of mergers and acquisitions. This Rule provides a further
significant ground to ensure that the market receives equal disclosure of confidential information in
the context of a tender offer.
120. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
121. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654-69 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 223-26
(1980); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
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disclose-or-abstain principle places a meaningful cost on directors and managers
who wish to trade secretly on their company's information.
It is worth briefly noting the deeper theoretical significance of the limita-
tions created by the requirement for a breach of fiduciary duty. Prior to Chiarella,
the law had emphasized that all investors must have roughly equal access to cor-
porate information. Under SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, the Second Circuit de-
termined that equal access should be the founding rationale governing liability.
In theory, this imposed liability on anyone in possession of material non-public
information-not just fiduciary insiders with access. Chiarella, however, firmly
circumscribes the range of potential defendants, and anchors liability in the
breach of a fiduciary norm, rather than simply coming into possession of non-
public information.22 From a legal standpoint, the fiduciary duty requirement
performs a further helpful function. Fiduciary breach and failure to properly dis-
close satisfies the "deception" prong required under Rule lOb-5.123
Misappropriation: In addition to corporate insiders owing a fiduciary duty
to their shareholders, the law also punishes actors that breach their fiduciary
duty to a "source" of confidential information. The misappropriation theory of
liability, as established by U.S. v O'Hagan, takes a broad view of protecting con-
fidential corporate information. Rather than confine its reach to select compa-
ny officers, the scope of the misappropriation doctrine is more diffuse.124
Under O'Hagan, breaching a fiduciary duty to a source of information-such as
an employer-constitutes the deception needed to ground a claim for insider
trading.25 Where a lawyer or accountant, for example, uses her access to confi-
dential client information to extract secrets and trade, O'Hagan offers redress.
122. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 847-48 ("[A]ll investors trading on impersonal exchanges have
relatively equal access to material information."); In re Cady, 40 S.E.C. at 912-915.
123. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 223-26. For discussion, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law
Fiduciary Duties Into the Federal Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1189,
1192-95 (1995); Donald C. Langevoort, "Fine Distinctions" in the Contemporary Law of Insider
Trading, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 429, 431-33 (2013) (discussing the centrality of
"constructive fraud" as grounding Rule 10b-5 liability for insider trading under Chiarella); A-C.
Pritchard, Justice Lewvis F Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the Federal Securities Laws, 52
DUKE L.J. 841, 845-47, 932-40 (2003) (discussing the role of Justice Powell in entrenching the
importance of the fiduciary principle). But see Nagy, supra note 5.
124. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 2; Carlton & Fischel, supra note 7; Goshen & Parchomovksy, supra
note 7 (noting the gap between the goals of securities regulation and insider trading); Langevoort,
supra note 123; Nagy, supra note 5 (discussing shifting doctrine in insider trading law).
125. As Langevoort notes, the SEC has sought to codify a broader reading of the misappropriation
theory under Rule 10b5-2. Under this theory, insider trading may be grounded on a broken pact of
confidentiality. See Langevoort, supra note 123, Parts II-III. For insightfil discussion, see Richard
W. Painter et al., Don't Ask, Just Tell: Insider TradingAfter United States v. O'Hagan, 84 VA. L.
REV. 153 (1998).
1005
63 UCLA L. REV. 968 (2016)
Here, a defendant does not owe a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the
company in whose securities she has traded. Rather her duty is to her own em-
ployer-the accountancy firm or law firm. She breaches her fiduciary promise
by secreting confidential information acquired by virtue of her employment and
misusing it for personal gain.126
The misappropriation theory has grounded recent SEC rulemaking in the
area of insider trading. Reflecting the protective approach of the misappropria-
tion theory, Rule 10b5-2 crystallizes the grounds on which insider trading liabil-
ity may be based. The Rule stipulates that a duty of trust and confidence is
sufficient to ground liability in relationships that are less legally formal than
those involving a fiduciary. A habit of maintaining confidences, familial bonds
of trust, or explicit agreements to respect confidentiality can all bring undis-
closed trading within the scope of the Rule 10b5-2 prohibition.1 27 Similarly,
emerging case law hints at expansive protection for confidential information.
The case of SEC v. Dorozhko is particularly telling.1 28 In this case, the Second
Circuit found that a group of hackers that stole information and traded on it
could show the requisite deception for Rule 10b-5 liability. As Donald Lange-
voort and Donna Nagy observe, the broadening scope of misappropriation re-
veals a deep discomfort among policymakers and courts with any trading on
confidential information. That laws must stretch to sanction news ways in
which information may be pilfered and used reflects this suspicion.
1 29
Regulation Fair Disclosure: Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), a major
piece of SEC rulemaking, expressly embraces the foundational principles of
equal access and fairness underlying the prohibition. It should be noted that
Reg FD does not ground a breach of Rule lOb-5.3 ° Reg FD prohibits issuers
from making selective disclosure to favored analysts or investment profession-
als. The Regulation requires that any disclosure that companies make must be
made simultaneously to everyone. This prevents professionals with opportuni-
ties to gain insider access-by virtue of their stature or influence-from enjoying
126. United States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2001) (a warehouse worker leaked copies of a
business magazine before the magazine went to print).
127. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2012).
128. SEC v. Dorozhko 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009).
129. Langevoort, supra note 123 at 450-55; Nagy, supra note 5. In August 2015, U.S. authorities also
charged a ring of Ukraine-based hackers for stealing corporate press releases before these were
released. See Gina Chon, US Says Insider Trading Ring Used Hackers, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2015,
3:01 PM) http://www.ft.com/int1/cms/s/0/9e8dd236-402b-1leS-9abe-5b335da3a90e.html#
axzz3z4mlhIGI [perma.cc/MC25-34EG].
130. Yadav, supra note 9. For discussion, see Langevoort, supra note 123 at 450-60; Selective
Disdosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51716, 51729 (Aug. 24, 2000) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 240, 243, and 249).
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a first look at important corporate disclosures. Reg FD supports the basic phi-
losophy of a regulatory system premised on market-wide distribution of corpo-
rate information. By emphasizing public disclosure-or no disclosure at all-it
underscores the significance of investor access above all. Crucially, just as Chi-
are/la scaled back liability through the requirement of a fiduciary duty under
Rule 10b-5 and extinguished the place of equal access in insider trading juris-
prudence, Reg FD returns it, in part, back into regulation."'
B. Insider Trading Harms
These three bases for liability under Rule 10b-5 and Reg FD control per-
ceived harms in the marketplace. To be sure, the regulation maps imprecisely
onto this spectrum of wrongs. Still, despite the contested application of the pro-
hibition, it seeks to broadly protect: (i) investors and their rights in information;
(ii) fairness and equal access; and (iii) the integrity of capital markets.
Investor Losses andBargaining Position: At its core, the prohibition works to
even out the playing field between insiders and other investors. Conventionally,
securities' trading by corporate insiders poses an obvious problem for other inves-
tors.132 Those with superior knowledge will always end up on the winning side of
the deal. Armed with confidential insights about the inner workings of a compa-
ny, insiders are well placed to know when to trade, what to trade and how much
the securities are worth. Their incentives will rationally push in favor of using
this knowledge most profitably, extracting maximum gains at the expense of less
informed players.33 Moreover, when insiders take advantage of the best trading
opportunities, they will leave fewer lucrative picks for everyone else.34 Both un-
der the classical theory as well as misappropriation, the prohibition places costs
on corporate and other constructive insiders that wish to trade. Either they must
131. For analysis on Reg FD, its rationales and effectiveness, see Jill Fisch, Regulation FD. An
Alternative Approach to Addressing Information Asymmetry, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
INSIDER TRADING 112 (Stephen M. Bainbridge ed., 2013). Note also the Exchange Act Rule
14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3, which similarly regulates trading on the basis of non-public
information in the context of tender offers and seeks to encourage disclosure to the market of
such information. This Article does not discuss this Rule as part of its analysis.
132. Joel Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal Securities Lazv Concerning Nonpublic Information, 73
GEO. LJ. 1083 (1985) (emphasizing the significance of investor protection as the guiding principle
of securities regulation). See also Sung Hui Kim, Insider Trading as Private Corruption, 61 UCLA
L. REV. 928 (2014) (identifying private corruption as a central harm).
133. Fried, supra note 7, at 458-59 (analyzing insider trading by choosing when not to trade, as much as
when trades are made).
134. William K.S. Wang, Trading on MaterialNon -Public Information on Impersonal Stock Markets. Who
Is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule lOb-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217, 1222-30
(1981) (detailing the key harms of insider trading).
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forego their advantage by revealing their cache of confidential insight to the mar-
ket-or they must abstain from trading.135 If they choose to proceed, their gains
are reduced by any punishment levied or by the costs that they must internalize to
hide their trading against encroaching regulators. In any event, insiders are made
to think twice before trading-and the lopsided playing field, tilted against inves-
tors, looks a little more even.
The insidiousness of insider trading is most apparent in jurisprudence un-
derlying the misappropriation theory of insider trading. As Langevoort observes,
the expansion of liability under OHagan to cover a disparate range of actors
points to a judicial view of insider trading as manifesting high deceit in capital
markets.36 Indeed, misappropriation-by its very terminology-seeks to protect
property rights inhering in corporate information. As the expansion of the mis-
appropriation doctrine in Rule 10b5-2 makes clear, the principle of preserving
corporate confidentiality and control rights has become a touchstone guiding
modem rulemaking and jurisprudence.37 The responsibility of protecting corpo-
rate confidentiality now lies with a range of outsiders, including corporate advi-
sors, concerned family members, associates, or corporate financial publishers.
Misappropriation thus relies on the theory that confidential information
constitutes an asset belonging to corporate shareholders who should be able to
extract its fill value for themselves. After O'Hagan, constructive insiders like law-
yers and accountants are not permitted to help themselves to the value generated
by information, even though their relationship to shareholders is indirect. Any
attempt to undercut the property rights in information-in its capacity as a
shareholder asset-constitutes a harm worthy of public sanction. Certainly, this
property rights theory of harm is not always theoretically consistent.38 But it
135. But see Fried, supra note 7 (on abstaining with insider information).
136. Langevoort, supra note 3.
137. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 123 (discussing the protection offered by the case of SEC v. Obus in
the context of tipper-tippee liability where liability attached to an instance of reckless tipping). But
see United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), where the standard appears to have
tightened. In Newman, notably, there must be a clear showing of personal benefit on the part of
the tipper and knowledge of this fact on the part of the tippee. Obus and Newman are cases whose
resolution is difficult to reconcile.
138. See, e.g., Carlton & Fischel, supra note 7; Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 7. As these scholars
observe, recognizing the primacy of corporate ownership rights in information weighs in favor of
allowing companies to also be capable of assigning those rights in accordance with their own
internal preferences. See e.g., Carlton & Fischel, supra note 7, 860-861. If companies really "own"
their confidential information, they should be able to decide who can trade using it. Id. That this is
not the way the law works suggests that other considerations are at play. It seems that
misappropriation is concerned with protecting corporate confidentiality more broadly, ensuring
that it is not easily undermined by an indeterminate set of outsiders trading on company secrets.
See Nagy, supra note 5.
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seems increasingly powerful. As seen in Doroszko, the property rights rationale
underlying misappropriation is carried to its logical conclusion, overriding the
need to show a fiduciary relationship to ground liability.139
Fairness andEqualAccess: Fairness and equal access to information consti-
tutes an important, albeit attenuated rationale for regulating information flows
in markets. In early decisions-notably, In re Cady Roberts14 ° and Texas Gulf
Sulphur41-the SEC and the court expressly rooted the prohibition in the need
to promote a level playing field between investors and to sustain broad access to
investor information. Cady Roberts, for example, underscored the "inherent un-
fairness" of a party with access to corporate information taking advantage of it to
make deals with someone holding no such privilege. Concern that corporate in-
siders might believe themselves institutionally entitled to win was considered
intolerable under doctrine.42 This strong tilt towards broad investor interests
was resoundingly embraced in Texas Gulf Sulphur. Here, the court sought to
equalize, as far as possible, the informational costs that different investors face.
After Chiarella, however, the significance of investor equality and access to in-
formation as a regulatory imperative has diminished substantially. The central
place of fiduciary duties as a prerequisite for liability highlights higher legal toler-
ance for asymmetries than was expressed in Cady Roberts and Texas Guf Sulphur.
But equality of access-and fairness to investors-still animates the law.
This is most evident in SEC rulemaking. Reg FD runs counter to Chiarella, and
it puts back into the law some of the Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence that Chiarella
took away. Under Reg FD, public companies cannot prefer one type of infor-
mational intermediary-brokers, investment analysts, institutional investors,
and certain existing shareholders-over investors at large. Attempts by public
companies to give informational favors to select actors can run afoul of the
Regulation. While it is by no means as robust a statement supporting equal ac-
cess and fairness as Cady Roberts or Texas Gulf, Reg FD highlights the continu-
ing deep roots cast by the equal access and fairness rationales in the regulation of
information flows. 43
139. In Newman, there is a narrowing of liability in the context of tipper-tippee liability. However, this
points to a narrowing in the context of the dassical theory of liability rather than under
misappropriation.
140. In re Cady, Roberts &Co., 40 S.E.C. 907,912 (1961).
141. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'don other grounds, 446 F.2d
1301 (2d Cir. 1971).
142. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 912. See also Merrill Lynch, Exchange Act Release No.
8459,43 S.E.C. 933, 936-9 (Nov. 25,1968).
143. See Fisch, supra note 131.
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Supporting Capital Markets: Where one set of insiders is primed to win by
virtue of their insider status rather than any special skill, perceptions of unfairness
can force even talented investors to stay away from the market.44 Systemic
asymmetries between informed insiders on the one hand and outsider investors
on the other can, scholars observe, also levy a real economic toll on capital mar-
kets. Since trading on securities markets is anonymous, such that investors
cannot know if they are trading with insiders, rational traders will discount for
the risks of being caught on the wrong side of the bargain. In the absence of
laws prohibiting insider trading, investors will internalize the costs of privately
policing their own risks, reducing the capital they bring to markets or leaving
markets if these risks become too great.145 As William Wang argues, investors
face serious disincentives that drive them away from capital markets, not just
because they will lose, but also because insiders will always take the best oppor-
tunities to transact, leaving few carrots behind for others.46
The harm goes beyond the bare fact of the amount of capital that investors
might bring to securities markets to also include the quality of their participation.
Informed investors face the greatest costs in the absence of the prohibition. Re-
turning to conventional theories of market efficiency, prices depend on funda-
mentally informed traders to infuse markets with their insights. This dynamic
relies, crucially, on informed investors to make money from their interaction with
capital markets. If corporate insiders are permitted to trade, they capture the best
deals in the markets ahead of even informed investors. Informed investors that
are not corporate insiders may be especially circumspect about entering markets
to trade absent the prohibition, or may trade only when they feel they have a surer
chance of gaining.
C. The Costs of the Prohibition
Restrictions on insider trading reflect a deep-seated tension between the
SEC's investor protection and capital formation goals.47 On the one hand, the
goal of securities regulation generally is to promote robust and fulsome mandato-
ry disclosures by public companies. With vibrant flows of information, prices
should be more accurate and markets more efficient at delivering capital to
144. See Langevoort, supra note 3, at 1319-20.
145. See Brudney, supra note 2; Wang, supra note 4.
146. K.S. Wang, supra note 4, at 1221-24.
147. The In vestors Advocate: How the SEC Protects In vestors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates
CapitalFormation, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (June 10, 2013), [http://www.perma.cc/QAS4-
VSHT].
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valuable enterprises.148 On the other hand, however, the prohibition against
insider trading pushes in the opposite direction. Primarily, it restricts trading
by the quintessentially informed trader: corporate insiders capable of imparting
valuable intelligence to price formation.49 Henry Manne, for example, has fa-
mously contested the benefits of the prohibition, arguing that its application sti-
fles information flows and undermines market efficiencies.5 Harm to market
efficiency, in turn, results in deeper harm to market quality-where prices are
thinly informative for all types of investors. Zohar Goshen and Gideon Parch-
movksy note the damaging impact of the prohibition on efficiency in securities
trading-but from the perspective of companies losing the value of their infor-
mation rights. If misappropriation hinges on privileging a company's property
rights in their information, it follows that companies might benefit from assign-
ing their rights to information entrepreneurs like analysts, to motivate them to
research and analyze more effectively.5 Scholars lament the contradiction be-
tween the policy aspirations of promoting informed markets on one hand and
restricting the trading of informed insiders on the other.2
Despite continued critiques, policy weighs in favor of investor protection as
the driving rationale anchoring the prohibition against insider trading. As seen in
the expansion of the misappropriation doctrine, particularly after Dorozhko and
Rule 10b5-2, policymakers have sought cures to the harms caused by unequal ac-
cess to information between investors and pervasive asymmetries in the bargain
between insiders and investors at large. Shifting doctrinal boundaries continue to
recalibrate how intensively the law polices information sharing in its various per-
mutations. 3 However, as a matter of policy, the prohibition continues to exer-
cise a powerful hold over markets by policing the allocation of information costs
between insiders and investors.
IV. INSIDERTRADING AND MARKET STRUCTURE
While the prohibition against insider trading focuses on minimizing harms
to investors and reducing the value of their information, its coexistence alongside
algorithmic market structure and HFT poses one of the strongest challenges to
its effectiveness. The prohibition's statement of harms provides an analytical lens
148. The issue of market and capital allocative efficiency is complicated and underpinned by significant
literature. For discussion, see Yadav, supra note 7.
149. See, e.g., Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 7.
150. Manne, supra note 7.
151. Goshen &Parchomovsky, supra note 7.
152. Carlton &Fischel, supra note 7; Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 7.
153. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014).
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through which to examine the effects of superior informational access to high-
speed traders and the impact this has on the market. This Part evaluates the in-
teraction between the prohibition and high-speed algorithmic trading. It shows
that preferred structural access for HET traders to market information creates
harms of the kind that have traditionally fallen within the purview of the prohi-
bition. Moreover, these harms reach deeply into the mechanisms that govern
securities trading and that intersect with key measures of market quality-its ef-
ficiency, liquidity and ability to allocate capital. Still, as shown here, current
doctrine does not constrain the harms generated by structural insiders. Structur-
al informational benefits for HET traders are perfectly legal. This Part shows
that while the harms of structural insider trading may be coextensive with those
of traditional corporate insider trading, current doctrine only applies to the lat-
ter. With the law reaching, but falling short of its policy goal to fix the costs of
all types of trading by insiders, questions follow about its broader efficacy for the
ever-innovative marketplace.154
A. Harms of Structural Insider Trading
Modern markets depend on a select cohort of high-speed traders for their
smooth functioning. As analyzed in Parts I and II, HFTs have, in large part,
supplanted traditional market makers, whose position and influence on everyday
trading has declined with the rise of computers and automation.55 Owing to
physical proximity through co-location, information feeds from exchanges, as
well as automatic responses to price changes, HFT traders receive and react to
trading information ahead of the wider market. A preview of exchange data for a
select group of traders, and the advantages this preview bestows, raises questions
about its impact on investors and market quality, broadly construed.
1. Investor Protection
The prohibition has traditionally safeguarded markets against the creation
of a systematically uneven playing field between corporate insiders and investors
at large. Insiders with the best access to corporate secrets are likely to perform
better than everyone else. First, insiders will catch the most favorable trading
windows. Second, outsiders are precluded from trading, and will also lose money
to insiders.
154. See also Yadav, supra note 9.
155. See Bessembinder et al., supra note 13.
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Similarly, first sight of exchange data gives HET traders an edge against
other "outsider" traders. This first look provides several ways for traders to make
consistent gains ahead of other investors.
Forecasting Markets: Similar to more conventional corporate insider trading,
the ability to catch the first glimpse of exchange data helps HFT traders forecast
the direction in which markets are headed. Subscription data feeds from ex-
changes provide insights about the order flows on the exchange and the best cur-
rent quotes to buy and sell securities. Feeds also offer insight into the imbalances
in buy and sell orders that indicate the direction of net demand for particular se-
curities. The NASDAQ 'Total View" feed, for example-the most comprehen-
sive data feed sold by NASDAQ-advertises the "full depth of the market at
every level." The Total View promises subscribers information about "all dis-
played quotes attributed to specific market participants" as well as "total displayed
anonymous interest." With additional information about imbalances in demand,
the feed can provide investors with extensive insight into nuanced market move-
ments-the current best order, likely demand, potential fiture price direction,
and so on."' Appendix 1 illustrates the dynamic. Constant streams of such data,
including the current best quotes, depth, and demand, all reaching co-located
servers first, can help HET traders to capture gains by: (i) reacting immediately to
submit a better quote that hits the co-located exchange before outsiders have even
seen the primary information; (ii) recognizing market momentum and trading in
the direction of future demand; and (iii) exiting positions preemptively in recog-
nition of potential trouble. These advantages can work to create more chances
for HET traders to capture better deals than "outsider" investors and to reduce
the trading opportunities that these outsiders enjoy.
Finance scholarship highlights the predictive dynamic of HiT. This ability
to "see" market activity ahead of others creates a systematically uneven playing
field and lower levels of uncertainty for structural insider HFTs versus other types
of traders. In an important study, Jonathan Brogaard, Terence Hendershott, and
Ryan Riordan observe that HET traders make markets more efficient by predic-
tively trading in the direction of future price changes. The authors also observe
that HFT traders correct momentary pricing errors by trading against them.
This suggests that HET traders are adept at interpreting market data to spot mis-
pricing and to trade quickly to correct problems. The canny ability of HFTs to
predict market direction ahead of other traders-over a period of a few seconds at
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least-would appear to point to the ability to read the market better, quicker, and
earlier than others.57 Without access to co-location, direct feeds, and expertly
programmed algorithms capable of automatically reacting to new information,
such predictive success would be impossible. Importantly, by virtue of this struc-
tural advantage, structural insiders enjoy a better chance of winning over other
types of traders.
Anticipating Order Flows: The ability of HFT traders to see market data first
and to anticipate order flows can allow HET traders to understand how funda-
mentally informed traders are likely to transact. By anticipating the actions of
informed traders-those who make money by investing in fundamental re-
search-HFT traders can make a surer profit by trading in the direction of de-
mand. There are numerous techniques that HET traders might use to
anticipate orders. For example, HET traders can take advantage of the multi-
plicity of competing exchanges in the NMS to race ahead of other traders from
one exchange to another. If Public Company shares trade in the NMS, they
may be bought and sold on various U.S. exchanges like the NYSE or the
NASDAQ. If a Mutual Fund wishes to buy 100,000 shares of Public Compa-
ny, it may have to go to several exchanges to purchase these securities. The Mu-
tual Fund order first goes to Exchange A, where 10,000 shares may be available
for $100 per share. HFTs can see this order enter Exchange A. They can then
quickly race to Exchanges B and C and buy up 90,000 shares at the best price,
eventually selling them to the Mutual Fund at a higher price.
HFTs can thus get ahead of informed traders-and take a small slice of the
available profit. They step in between a fundamentally informed trader and the
best available quote, raising (slightly) the price that the informed investor pays.5
These trends are far from theoretical. Scholars are observing anticipation in
action and increased costs for informed investors. In one study looking at a year's
worth of NASDAQtrades, Nicholas Hirschey finds evidence of HFT traders
anticipating the transactions of non-HFT investors and trading ahead of them.5 9
According to this study, anticipation is pronounced in trades for smaller or mid-
cap stocks-the kinds of securities that typically see trading from more informed
157. Brogaard et al., supra note 77; Alain Chaboud et al., Rise of the Machines.'Algorithmic Trading in the
Foreign Exchange Market, 69 J. OF FIN. 2045 (2014) (higher efficiencies in foreign exchange
markets); Austin Gerig, High-Frequency Trading Synchronizes Prices in Financial Markets (Nov. 8,
2012) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.sec.gov/dera/staff-papers/working-papers/dera-wp-
hft-synchronizes.pdf (contemporaneous changes in prices across securities markets).
158. Jarrow & Protter, supra note 23, at 3-6 (discussing predatory trading). For a discussion of the
literature, see Yadav, supra note 7, Part III.C.
159. Nicholas H. Hirschey, Do High Frequency TradersAnticipate Buying and Selling Pressure? (Apr. 1,
2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.conm/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2238516.
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investors.160 In another study simulating human trading in the presence of a ma-
chine trader, Jaksa Cvitanic and Kirilenko find that the arrival of an automated
trader impacts the price that investors pay. Notably, the study authors saw costs
increase for investors when the machine trader entered the simulation-owing,
the authors posited, to the automated actor taking the best quotes on the market
ahead of other investors.
1 61
Anticipating the orders of informed traders represents a rational strategy for
HFT traders with first sight of market data. For a start, gains should be more
predictable when HFT traders know that they will always have an available buyer
ready and willing to pay for the deal. By trading ahead of informed traders, HFT
traders can become synthetically informed for themselves by copying the behav-
ior of information traders, rather than using their own resources to develop native
expertise. Moreover, as proprietary traders using their own money to trade, HET
traders do not owe any legal duty that might prevent them from transacting
ahead of informed traders in the marketplace. In an arms-length marketplace,
HFT traders are simply using their superior skill and sophistication to their ad-
vantage.
In short, investors face costs in using private information for trading, in-
cluding loss of trading opportunity and investment in schemes to HET struc-
tural insiders. 1 62 Arguably, this erosion of informational rights should normally
be enough to trigger scrutiny under insider trading doctrine. As seen in Cady
Roberts, O'Hagan, and Dorozhko, courts have vigorously guarded the value of
investor rights in information against erosion by privileged insiders. This ero-
sion has usually been a sufficient harm to justify intervention without requiring
that these losses be balanced against the gains that might accrue for efficiency.
2. Equal Access to Information
Equal access to information has provided a powerful animating rationale for
the prohibition against insider trading, though the weight of its influence has
waned after Chiarella. With jurisprudence emphasizing a fiduciary duty as a pre-
requisite for liability, securing equal access to information is less pressing as a
matter of policy than it once might have been. However, as Reg FD shows, equal
160. Barday et al., supra note 63.
161. Jaksa Cvitanic & Andrei Kirilenko, High Frequency Traders and Asset Prices (Mar. 11, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssm.com/abstract=1569067; see also Lin Tong, A Blessing or a
Curse? The Impact of High Frequency Trading on Institutional Investors 2-5 (Oct. 5, 2015)
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2330053. For
discussion of the literature with respect to fundamental efficiency, see Yadav, supra note 7.
162. See Hirschey, supra note 159, at 1-3.
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access to information has not disappeared from the canon as a legitimate rationale
for rulemaking. Set alongside the intricate regulatory framework governing
mandatory disclosure from public companies, equal access fits into a regulatory
system premised heavily on disclosure that seeks to widely secure information for
investors at large.
First, algorithmic markets foster structural inequalities in information access
through the advantages of co-location and direct feeds. Automatic programming
help traders make the most of this access by enabling them to trade instantly. In-
formative feeds like the NASDAQ_"Total View" service offer investors rich re-
serves of data and the ability to choose layers of depth and detail.163 The NYSE
similarly offers a range of information feeds to cover different grades of detail
across its various markets.64 Transmitted to co-located servers, those able to gar-
ner access to these services gain a first sight of information from the market.6
It is arguable, however, that there is nothing especially unequal or new
about these arrangements. Indeed, they might even fit established patterns of
behavior long embedded in market design. Traders have often been close to ex-
changes to trade-the trading pits, for example, comprising traders dealing
with each other face-to-face. Moreover, anyone can buy the data feeds offered
by exchanges. As long as they have the money and technology to stream the
data to their offices, there is little preventing them from purchasing the high
depth of information on offer.
There is much merit in these arguments. At face value, they explain away
today's differences in structural access as natural and as roughly replicating an his-
torical allocation of information costs between actors. They are, however, in-
complete. They fail to wrestle with the question of whether today's markets
reflect a fundamental and qualitatively different model of dissemination and what
the impact of this design is within the larger project of mandatory disclosure in
regulation. Both inquiries contest the view that today's markets are nothing new.
Concerns about equal access, however, are pertinent owing to the signifi-
cant disparity in the quality of information received between one set of inves-
tors-those that subscribe to feeds and are co-located-versus those that choose
to not to rely on these services. Discussed in Part II, U.S. public markets typically
display prices through the consolidated ticker tape. This displays the best offer
163. Overview, supra note 104.
164. DATA PRODUCTS BY TYPE.. REAL-T]VIE DATA, NYSE MARKET DATA, http://www.nyxdata.
corn/Data-Products/Real-Time-Data [http://perma.cc/K2KL-WHUT] (last visited Mar. 8,
2016).
165. Co-LocATION (COLO), NASDAQ http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/Trader.aspx?id=colo [http://
perma.cc/4HG5-QU35] (last visited Mar. 8, 2016).
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and sale price for a security, generated by all exchanges submitting their best
numbers into an aggregator-the SIP. One big problem with the ticker is that its
information is almost always out of date. In the time it takes for information to
be collected to deliver a market price, HFTs and others have already traded and
rendered this price obsolete. To the extent that the market price is nearly always
an artifact, it is worthwhile to challenge its relevance as a trading tool, as well as a
key benchmark for governance.166
Additionally, the data underpinning the exchange feeds is not only much
faster but also significantly richer in its composition than that reflected in the
public ticker. When it comes to trading, subscribers to exchange feeds can select
from a menu of options, offering enormous detail to help traders make the best
trading decisions. The ticker, by contrast, comprises a much thinner reserve of
data, essentially the best bids and offers on all the different exchanges that make
up the national market in the U.S.167 This gap in content is unsurprising. Ex-
changes have little private incentive to enrich the ticker feed beyond the minimum
required to generate the national best bid and offer price. Yet exchanges hold
enormous quantities of data that may easily be packaged and sold to willing mar-
ket participants. The revenue that exchanges can make from this information
should rationally drive exchanges to focus their efforts on developing richer re-
serves of information and technology for subscribers rather than on the SIP. In-
deed, leading exchanges invest heavily in cutting-edge technology designed to
communicate information as fast and fully as possible to co-located servers. For
example, exchanges promise wireless communications between data centers
using top-of-the-line microwave transmission designed to reduce round-trip
times for trades by 1-2 microseconds. Structural HET insiders appear to be
driving this innovation in information collection and transmission."'
Secondly, this disparity in information flows sits uneasily within the larger
context of mandatory disclosure, designed to make information cheaply available
to investors at large. As reflected in the disclosure system underlying U.S. securi-
ties regulation, public companies internalize significant costs in publishing de-
tailed information about their organization and activities for the market.
Targeting investors at large, this disclosure function has subsidized access to pri-
vate information for investors at large, and is designed to foster efficient trading
in securities markets. Deep disparities in access to trading data cut against this
bargain.
166. See Edmans, Goldstein &Jiang, supra note 30.
167. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
168. CO-LOCATION(COLO), supra note 165.
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HFT programming, co-location, and data feeds mean that enormous
swaths of the market-those that rely solely on the SIP-are effectively denied
up-to-date market information, and do not exert direct impact on immediate
price formation (Appendix 1). This is significant for the traditional taxonomy of
efficient prices. Informative prices reflect the collective trading of heterogeneous
actors, each bringing their insight to the exchange. Where markets systematically
give outsized access to one or another group of traders in the price formation pro-
cess, concerns might fairly be raised about the larger project of securing richly in-
formed prices. While this does not mean that outsider investors cannot and will
not participate in markets, it does signify that their decisions are likely to be based
on a dated reading of the market. At the level of principle, this disparity raises
questions about what degree of inequality of access to trading information is tol-
erable. With Chiarella and Reg FD pulling in opposite directions, there is little
guidance on how to resolve this question.
3. Investor Protection and Market Quality
The fundamental question is whether differential access to exchange data
creates harms for market quality, broadly understood. By the conventional ac-
count, theory paints a bleak picture. From the viewpoint of investor protection,
the harms can be substantial and far-reaching. If insiders repeatedly get the best
deals, then other investors have little incentive to remain on the market, or to de-
ploy their capital fully. Markets are eventually drained of their power to allocate
capital, leaving public companies with far fewer sources of funding and signaling
mechanisms to advertise their value.69
Algorithmic markets present two sources of risk for diminished market
quality: (i) first sight of exchange data adversely impacts outsider investors, par-
ticularly through anticipation strategies that result in outsiders losing a slice of
their gains; and (ii) unequal access to price information creates deep disparities in
the information received by different types of investor.170
Market Flight: If outsider investors are constantly seeing their orders antici-
pated and a slice of their winnings diminished, they might leave markets or
change how they transact in them. This problem is most serious for informed
traders, who invest in research and seek to trade strategically to take advantage of
specific market windows. Traditionally, law and markets sought ways to foster
169. See Brudney, supra note 2; Wang, supra note 4.
170. For iffler discussion, see Yadav, supra note 9. The scholarship on the larger question of HFT and
market quality is considerable, a fill discussion of which is outside the scope of this Article.
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greater trading by informed investors by placing constraints on designated market
makers to extract information by virtue of their positional power.
Emerging scholarship paints a mixed picture. As Hirschey, Cvitanic, and
Kirilenko note, informed traders face losses as well as a slew of transaction costs
from structural insiders, including: (i) losses on trades where the best deals are
sealed by HET traders; and (ii) strategic costs to hide their trades from HET
traders.171 There is little scholarship, however, to suggest hat informed investors
are fleeing markets in response to their structural disadvantage. HET traders,
particularly as market makers, can offer lower spreads for investors. To the extent
that investors value the trade-off, the loss of some their informational gains to
HFT traders may simply be internalized as a cost of doing business.72 Secondly,
the losses imposed by structural disadvantages may simply be too small to con-
cern large informed traders. If informed traders really consider a transaction
worth making, they should do so irrespective of whether HFT takes away frac-
tions of a penny in value from each traded share.
But it is far too early to summarily dismiss theoretical concerns about in-
vestor participation and market quality. Even if investors might not leave mar-
kets in numbers, they might still alter how they participate in them. Concerns
about seeing their best intelligence anticipated by HET traders might lead to
greater reliance on evasive techniques to strategically hide orders or to trade
them off-exchange. Cumulatively, widespread cloak-and-dagger behavior in
markets, particularly from informed traders, can prove problematic. Their sig-
nals will end up becoming more costly to interpret, diminishing the expressive
potential of markets and securities prices. Where investors internalize added
costs of interpreting overly complex signaling, investor participation may grow
more cautious as a whole.
Some anecdotal accounts of investor behavior suggest that investors are
more deliberate about where they trade. In addition to popular public outcry,"'
industry efforts have prompted the creation of trading venues that limit the struc-
tural advantages enjoyed by HET traders. Institutional investors-such as hedge
funds, mutual funds and insurers-are funding efforts to build private trading
171. The issue on whether HFT makes markets volatile is complex. For a survey of the literature, see
SEC LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 18, at 9-10.
172. See also Jackson et al., supra note 20, at 4 (suggesting that fimamental information takes longer
(around 100 seconds) to emerge in prices than short-term information, potentially pointing to a
continued role for information traders); Nataliya Bershova & Dmitri Rakhlin, High-Frequency
Trading and Long-Term Investors. A View From the Buy-Side, 2 J. INV. STRATEGIES 25 (2013)
(showing a fall in the spreads faced by investors in Tokyo and London stock exchanges despite the
increase in volatility on account of HiFT).
173. See, e.g., MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: AWALL STREET REVOLT (2014).
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venues and platforms that are less vulnerable to anticipation by HFT traders.74
Rather than trading on public exchanges, institutional investors are seeking out
private venues that limit access to HET traders. While this does not signal an
outright flight from exchanges, it does point to investors specifically selecting
venues to avoid structural insiders. If informed investors possess high quality in-
sights, they may favor trading outside of public exchanges, lowering the overall
quality of price formation on the national market.
Equal_/ccess: The disparity of information reaching investors via exchanges
is also problematic from the perspective of market quality. It increases the costs
of procuring information for investors. If the ticker conveys significantly dimin-
ished and largely outdated information, investors face stronger pressures to spend
money to acquire subscription feeds from multiple exchanges. Indeed, even those
that spend money on data feeds will still receive old data if they do not also take
advantage of co-location. Scholars suggest that the ability of exchanges to com-
moditize and sell information undermines market quality. It motivates those
with less price information to retreat from the market. Knowing that they have
poorer access to informative prices, David Easley, Maureen O'Hara, and Liyan
Yang show that such "price uninformed" traders reduce their involvement in
trading, undermining liquidity in the process.75 Also, because informed traders
must also purchase data feeds, they have less money to spend on valuable re-
search.176
Fundamentally, however, these information costs for investors challenge
the conventional mechanisms by which markets become efficient. Recalling
Gilson and Kraakman's interaction between informed, derivatively informed,
and uninformed traders, subscription costs for information feeds create higher
entry costs for traders. The impact may be felt more strongly amid the ranks of
derivatively informed and uninformed traders.77 Derivatively informed firms
must pay more to extract the data they need to follow and mimic the behavior of
informed traders. Uninformed traders will lose anyway to more informed trad-
ers, but they will suffer higher transaction costs to purchase market data. Even
informed traders-who should make the greatest gains trading--will need to
174. See, e.g., Stephen Foley, Big Fund Managers Form New Dark Pool Equity Trading Venue, FIN.
TIMES (Jan. 19, 2015, 11:56 PM), http://www.ft.com/ind/cms/s/0/372de622-aO34-11e4-aa89-
00144feab7de.html#axzz3ogFN557i [perma.cc/4MSH-GLE9]; About IEX, IEX,
http://www.iextrading.com/about [http://perma.cc/XHD4-U2Y4] (last visited Oct. 25, 2015).
On issues with dark pools, fragmentation, and transparency, see Amy Kwan et al., Trading Rules,
Competition for OrderFlov andMarketFragmentation, 115 J. FIN. ECON. 330 (2015).
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spend more in purchasing information from exchanges. While prospective
profits might justify these costs for informed traders, higher information ex-
penditures may eventually become more difficult to justify for those making less
certain returns. If uninformed investors drop out of the market altogether, in-
formed traders might have few others left to transact with and-relegated to
trading with each other-they may eventually see fewer profits.
HFT structural insiders-while still paying for exchange information-face
a proportionally lower bundle of risks and transaction costs. Acquiring deep in-
formational access to the marketplace constitutes an essential prerequisite for
HFT, but the gains from investment are considerable. HFT traders succeed by
generating steady and certain gains by making markets and anticipating order
flows. By being able to make small gains from informed, derivatively informed,
and uninformed traders, HET traders do not need to invest in fundamentally re-
searching securities or in losing consistently to informed traders.
B. Doctrinal Reach
The operation of structural insiders-and their potential to generate harms
and asymmetries similar to those seen in more conventional examples of insider
trading-might suggest greater legal scrutiny be given to their operation. Yet the
flourishing of structural insiders in modern markets highlights the limits of cur-
rent doctrine. Notwithstanding the capacity of a small cohort of insiders to sys-
tematically access not-fully-public information for private trading, there is little
doctrine can do to remedy these harms. On the question of whether structural
insiders fall within the class of legal insiders conventionally held to account under
insider trading regulation, the response is straightforward: Despite their system-
atic informational advantage, structural insiders do not fall within the strictures of
current insider trading law.
The Classical Theory: Structural insiders fall far from the purview of the clas-
sical account of insider trading. The classical theory controls those closest to
company management and that are subject to a fiduciary obligation to sharehold-
ers. Under Dirks and Chiarella, a fiduciary responsibility to shareholders remains
necessary to establish liability. The securities trading apparatus is removed from
the internal machinations of a company and the fiduciary responsibilities that
usually accompany it.
The Misappropriation Theory: Structural insiders also fall outside the purview
of the misappropriation theory, despite its breadth and the easing of the require-
ment to show a fiduciary duty. Under the misappropriation theory, liability for
insider trading can attach to those that trade on information they obtain by
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breaching a fiduciary responsibility to the source of the information. Under Rule
10b5-2, liability can cover those that breach promises to maintain confidentiality
and who trade on secrets shared within relationships of trust and confidence.178
One could argue, at a stretch, that structural insiders extract information from ex-
changes for trading before it becomes public. Like Chiarella, the financial printer
that used its first glimpse of corporate documents to make informed trades, struc-
tural insiders similarly see information before vast swaths of the market and trade
for personal gain. Unlike the defendant in Chiarella, however, who would most
probably be liable under misappropriation, structural insiders have no need to
worry. Open dealing and disclosure negate liability. When transactions occur in
the open, there is little deception, nullifying the reach of Rule 10b-5.
With structural insider trading, dealings take place in fill public view.
Much of the apparatus driving the creation of co-location and direct feeds even
occurs with regulatory blessing. Co-location arrangements are subject to review
by the SEC, and a public comment process ensures that any changes in those
terms are open to debate.79 Direct feeds are advertised, often including the pric-
es and products offered.8°
With both co-location and direct feeds accepted by law and publically ad-
vertised, the reach of insider trading law-even given the wide berth allowed by
misappropriation-seems limited. This disconnect poses a problem for the cur-
rent law's aspiration to offer full cover for the harms of systemic information
asymmetries in the market. At least presently, the harms might exist but the law
cannot cure them.
Reg FD: Finally, Reg FD applies to corporate issuers-not o traders or ex-
changes. Moreover, following Dirks and Chiarella, the law does not adhere to
equal access as a central imperative in securities trading. To the extent hat ex-
changes are obliged to make information available widely, their mandate lies in
ensuring that their data is submitted simultaneously into their SIP and direct
feeds. Within this framework, by the letter of the law, structural insiders appear
once more to fall in line.
V. IMPLICATIONS
Structural insiders have transformed the conventional bargain underlying
the allocation of information costs in securities markets. As elaborated by the
theory of harms underpinning the prohibition against insider trading, this
178. See discussion supra Part II.AN3.
179. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
180. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
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bargain has deeply shaped the allocation of informational rights and costs in
securities trading. By utilizing the traditional theoretical framing offered by
the prohibition, this Article shows that the harms that justified sanction un-
der the prohibition are also visible in HET. HFT has created a class of informed
insiders capable of transacting ahead of other types of market actors. With this
structural advantage, HFTs are well placed to predict future order flows, antici-
pate informed investors, and make more certain gains by trading before infor-
mation becomes fully public. These systematic informational advantages
institutionalize practices that are generally anathema to the law and policy of
insider trading. Emerging evidence suggests that these structural asymmetries
foster several recognized harms: (i) costs to investors, especially informed trad-
ers; (ii) deep disparities in access to information; and (iii) diminished market
quality. The similarity of these harms to the harms associated with convention-
al insider trading notwithstanding, current insider trading doctrine is clearly ill
suited to offer a remedy.
This Part surveys the implications of structural insiders for the law and poli-
cy of insider trading. First, it explores whether the usual justification for tolerat-
ing insider trading-enhancing informational efficiency-credibly holds with
respect to HET structural insiders. Without a justification supporting structural
insiders, asymmetries in access to information become more difficult to sustain.
Otherwise, it is clear that reconciling market structure with the underlying policy
of the prohibition requires developing strategies to more fully equalize the playing
field between HET insiders and other actors.
Secondly, without reform, the place of the prohibition as a catch-all protec-
tion for confidential corporate information becomes significantly weaker. Where
the law allows insider trading in one context, but punishes it elsewhere, the doc-
trinal and policy coherence of the prohibition begins to look decidedly tenuous
and points to a need for urgent reform.
A. The Efficiency Rationale
Critics of the prohibition against insider trading have long perceived it as a
stifling influence on the ability of high-quality information to enter securities
prices.181 Their disapproval has rested on the seeming incompatibility of prohibi-
tion with the larger policy goal of assuring richly informed, efficient markets. If
corporate insiders are prevented from trading, markets lose out on arguably their
most reliable and deeply informed source of insight. According to this view, the
181. See sources cited supra note 7.
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greater goal of achieving informational efficiency in securities prices trumps other
policy objectives like investor protection, or least makes them less compelling. If
trading by corporate insiders brings systematic gains for informational efficiency,
scholars argue, the prohibition should give way in favor of realizing this goal.
Perhaps the strongest justification for the continued informational ad-
vantage enjoyed by HFT structural insiders lies in its possible contribution to ef-
ficient markets. If HFT traders bring more informed trading to securities prices,
these welfare gains might offset the weight of the harms detailed in this Article.
Are HFTMarkets More Informative: It is necessary to distinguish the infor-
mational content of prices from the speed at which this information enters prices.
Co-located HET traders do not add to the informational richness of markets,
though they may allow prices to respond faster to new information than they oth-
erwise would.82 Even then, it is essential to ask whether these gains in speed are
sufficiently beneficial as to justify the costs of the structural asymmetries.
Corporate insiders have the best access to company secrets. As detailed by
Carlton and Fischel, corporate insiders can impart uniquely in-depth knowledge
by transacting on the information they possess.83 Precisely because of their supe-
rior position, they are viewed with deep suspicion by law and policy, primed to
pick off other investors with their store of credible, confidential information.
While rules against corporate insider trading might benefit investor protection,
the market also loses out on an essential source of substantive and reliable insight.
The same cannot be said for HET insiders. Recall that HET traders benefit
from structural access to gain information on: (i) order flows in markets, delivered
by rich data feeds from exchanges to co-located servers; (ii) informed orders; and
(iii) first sight of general market information delivered through data feeds. HET
traders mine current and emerging data, rather than procuring fundamental in-
formation akin to informed traders and company insiders. It makes little sense for
traders committed to exiting their investment in microseconds to engage in
meaningful research. Rather, HET traders can do best by using their speed and
structural access to deduce and trade on near-term trading trends. 4
In contrast to conventional corporate insiders, restricting preferential struc-
tural access for HET traders should not directly reduce the informational content
of trading. Co-located HET traders are simply extracting information from pre-
sent and past market conditions, rather than supplying fresh intelligence for price
formation. Informed traders should continue to transact, as will those that are
182. On HFT and fimdamental allocative efficiency, see Yadav, supra note 7.
183. See generally Carlton & Fischel, supra note 7 (pointing to the desirability of loosening the
prohibition to allow for trading by corporate insiders and to thus improve efficiencies).
184. See Hirschey, supra note 159.
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derivatively informed or uninformed.185 Their interactions should continue to
generate prices reflecting the sum of collective wisdom. The traditional efficiency
rationale that might make the case for loosening the prohibition does not hold.
Structural access for HET traders does not directly make markets fundamentally
more informative.
Indeed, it might even be said to reduce the informational content of prices if
informed traders leave markets because HET traders systematically anticipate
trades.86 Structural insider trading can lead informed investors to reduce their
expenditure on research and to lower or modify how they participate in public
markets. Some fundamental investors are already developing strategies to avoid
co-located HET traders by building their own private venues for trading-
fragmenting liquidity and making it harder to deduce the meaning of their trad-
ing. Short of leaving markets, expenditure on such evasions point to informed
investors modifying their behavior in response to being rationally picked offby an
advantaged group of traders. Where such behavior is widespread among in-
formed traders, the social costs to markets may be pervasively reflected in poorer
prices.
Efficiency is, of course, a complicated notion. While HET traders might
not contribute to actual informational content, their trading boosts the speed by
which intelligence enters prices. HET traders help make markets more sensitive
to new information. Consistent with the taxonomy proposed by Gilson and
Kraakman, HET traders can enhance the velocity by which information is incor-
porated into prices. By anticipating the transactions of informed traders and rap-
idly transacting to reflect this intelligence, fundamental information can emerge
much faster into prices than it might otherwise have done.87 Further, beyond
the operational mechanics by which information enters markets, efficiency gains
can also arise indirectly. Due to the lower transaction costs offered by HET, no-
tably in the form of reduced spreads, more investors might be encouraged to
trade. Informed investors might even enter markets more willingly, open to us-
ing a broader array of significant as well as not-so-significant information on ac-
count of cheaper entry and exit costs.
These indirect benefits for markets reflect a new trade-off. Whereas a
failure to include corporate insiders in everyday trading results in real infor-
mation loss, limiting informational privileges of HET presents a quite different
185. SeeJackson et al., supra note 21.
186. See discussion supra Part IV.A.3.
187. Brogaard et al., supra note 77 (observing the ability of HFT to anticipate short term price trends);
Gerig, supra note 157 (noting the ability of HFT traders to make markets efficient across various
asset dasses); Hirschey, supra note 159.
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proposition. The reserve of information stays the same. Its cost, however,
changes. Deprived by degrees of their access to early sight of exchange infor-
mation, HFT traders may charge more for their services as liquidity providers
and economic market makers.188 Rather than mediating a trade-offbetween in-
vestor protection versus efficient markets, insider-trading policy must referee a
new debate: Are the harms of HiT access to insider information justified by ap-
parent gains from structural efficiencies (reduced spreads and more liquidity)?189
Even here, some additional considerations factor into the analysis. It is ar-
guable that the gains in the speed by which information arrives because of HFT
traders are too marginal to be meaningful. Advantages are measured in millisec-
onds and microseconds. It is at least debatable whether such ultra-fast price
changes convey sufficient gains in transaction costs and liquidity to justify the
costs of structural insider trading.
The dilemma for scholars and policymakers lies in the difficulty of the com-
parison. Whereas the traditional trade-off in insider trading concerns itself
squarely with calibrating a tolerable loss of information in favor of investor pro-
tection, the modern equation balances investor protection versus investor toler-
ance for transaction costs. Information loss does not come into the picture. To
the extent that insider trading law and policy confronts relative gains and losses in
information, dealing with questions of structural pay-offs presents a problem.
B. Reconciling Policy and Practice
If policymakers consider the harms of structural insider trading as suffi-
ciently serious to merit evaluation, options for reform will be costly and far-
reaching, necessitating structural change. With tens of billions of dollars already
spent on transforming exchange infrastructure, attempts at re-thinking the cur-
rent design will require overcoming path dependencies and transactional habits
that are baked into the market's trading structure. With this in mind, I set out
below some first steps towards a better fit between insider trading laws and mar-
ket design.
Equalizing Access: As this Article has shown, market structure comprises
a cohort of structural insiders that enjoy the first glimpse of not-fully-public
188. Katya Malinova et al., Do Retail Investors Suffer From High Frequency Traders? (Nov. 18, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.con/abstract=2183806 (noting that a tax affecting high
frequency traders in Canada increased market wide bid-ask spreads by 9 percent).
189. Note that commentators still argue that reduced transaction costs through lower spreads are
illusory, as investors can face high costs of deciphering data as well as losses through order
anticipation.
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exchange information. Importantly, their structural advantage derives from a
convergence of three basic benefits acting together: (i) physical proximity to
exchanges through co-location; (ii) direct feeds of detail-rich information
from exchanges to co-located servers; and (iii) the ability to transact automati-
cally and instantaneously based on this information. This trifecta of structural
gain means that HET traders see information first and can transact on it be-
fore traders at large have had a chance to even see the information. Not only
does this advantage permit HET traders to see the state of the market before
anyone else, but it also allows them to alter it first based on their private trad-
ing preferences. In other words, HET traders have an advantageous window in-
to current prices as well as a uniquely powerful ability to contribute to price
formation. With outsider investors facing a longer, costlier road to information-
al insight and price impact, the asymmetry in access to all-important exchange
information is obvious. This asymmetry means that HET traders can see order
flows more clearly as well as anticipate orders, potentially at a cost to informed
and other types of investors.
This structure suggests that a change to any one of these factors-physical
co-location, direct feeds, or automatic algorithmic decisionmaking-might be
sufficient to bring greater equality between investors. If reform can reduce the
advantage offered by any one of these features, HFT traders might end up on a
more even playing field with other traders.
But this approach is unlikely to be especially effective. Altering the entry
rules for co-location, direct feeds, or instant algorithmic decision making ends up
becoming over-inclusive in each case. That is, in addition to covering HET trad-
ers, the restrictions would also reach traders who enjoy no special, first-access ad-
vantage with respect to exchange information.
An example serves to illustrate the problem. Take the case of the gains
achievable by direct feeds of exchange information. These rich data streams of-
ten communicate directly with co-located servers, but they can be purchased by
anyone willing to spend the money. Suppose that lawmakers move to restrict
the use of direct feeds, stipulating for example, that they be standardized across
exchanges and include less information than is currently on offer. In theory,
HET traders will see some losses, because their data feeds are less in-depth and
perhaps not sufficiently informative to provide a fulsome idea of order flows.
But everyone else will see losses as well. Structural outsiders will see thinner in-
formation and be forced to privately invest in overcoming deficiencies. Similar-
ly, physical co-location might not be a problem in itself. Co-located servers can
be used by those that wish to be close to an exchange and may in theory include a
range of traders, not necessarily only those that wish to trade at ultra-fast speeds.
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Moreover, even if co-location servers are dismantled, there is little stopping
those that wish to trade faster to buy up real estate privately as close as possible to
an exchange.
A larger, structural approach is needed. One possible model lies in building
small delays into order submissions sent to the exchange. Rather than traders
competing with each other on the speed by which orders reach an exchange, in-
built delays work to slightly even the playing field between traders. Delays-even
by a few hundred microseconds-can allow a wider array of algorithmic traders to
compete for orders on an exchange. With some micro- or milliseconds worth of
a delay in place, orders from institutional traders might not be systematically
usurped in part by the innately faster trader. While HFT traders can still receive
direct feeds and be co-located, the insights received through early sight of this in-
formation do not have to result in systematic gains for the HFT traders. With
delays part of order submission, HET traders have to internalize higher time
costs in utilizing the insights they acquire in the market. With higher costs, their
gains vis-A-vis other traders are reduced. While HFT traders may still be slightly
advantaged and may even see their orders reach the exchange before those sent by
other traders, built-in delays can reduce the frequency by which this advantage is
realized. Put more simply, delays in sending orders for execution reduces the im-
pact of any structural informational advantage. Just as designated market makers
have long faced restrictions in how they could use any informational access for
their private trading, the structure of high frequency markets demands a new de-
sign. Instead of relying on rules to prevent anticipation of order flows or in-
formed traders-that may be overinclusive and difficult to enforce-delays in the
system can instead work to add a small cost to inherent informational ad-
vantage.19°
Crucially, delays help mitigate the disadvantage that outsider investors face
in contributing to price formation. This Article shows that structural insiders
play an outsized role in price formation. Because outsiders struggle to see up-to-
date prices, they are effectively trading on stale information. The singular influ-
ence of structural insiders on prices can preclude others from also exercising a
meaningful role. Relatedly, a delay in order submission can help reduce the dis-
parity in access to price data. With delays, outsiders maybe better able to transact
on up-to-date information. They may be able to at least see the latest prices, be-
fore HFTs can submit orders to trade on them and update prices. While HFT
190. See generally Eric Budish et al., The High-Frequency TradingArn Race: Frequent BatchAuctions as a
Market Design Response, 130 Qj. ECON. 1547 (2015) (detailing the gains of batching orders in
bundles that effectively work to slow down the pace of trading).
1028
Insider Trading and High-Frequency Trading
traders might retain an advantage, a clearer sight of prices for other investors
allows them to better understand the meaning of prices and to influence their
formation more fully.
The idea of building delays into markets is gaining some traction, with at-
tempts within the industry to develop platforms that work to more fully equalize
the playing field between HFT traders and other investors. Made famous in
Michael Lewis' Flash Boys, the IEX exchange, for example, imposes a mandato-
ry delay of 350 microseconds on incoming orders to reduce the structural gains
available to HET traders. It still offers direct feeds of its data to subscribers from
its Secaucus presence, but it harnesses delays to open up its venue for competi-
tion by a variety of traders.191
But building delays into the system is neither easy nor without its own set
of problems. For one, calibrating the right length of delay presents an espe-
cially difficult conundrum. It must achieve a finely tuned balance between
dampening the advantage of structural insiders-and still preserving the bene-
fits of HFT. To the extent that HFT is viewed positively as a boon for liquidity
and a curb on transaction costs, policy (and investors) might wish to maintain
HFT's presence in markets. The IEX exchange, for example, is reported to
host HFT participation of anywhere between 17 to 34 percent, depending on
how one measures HFT activity. 92 There is, of course, no perfect number.
But in the absence of investor tolerance for higher transaction costs, policy-
makers might well look for a goldilocks figure balancing investor protection
with the gains of structural efficiency.
Also, viewed philosophically, delays designed to disproportionately affect
faster traders lie in tension with how markets have worked in the past. Markets
usually reward, rather than punish, speed and guile. Traders have always fought
to generate gains in speed, racing to get to the best trades ahead of their competi-
tors-HFT is arguably not all that different a practice.93 This line of criticism is
understandable. Using the tool of time delays as a proxy to correct structural im-
balances in access to information is imprecise-relying on limits on speed in place
of deeper structural change. Still, as this Article has shown, the structural infor-
mational advantage accorded to HET traders in today's markets is something
191. IEXAnnounces: Displayed Orders andNon-Protected Top of Book Quote Feed, IEX, (Nov. 3, 2014),
http://www.iextrading.con/trading/alerts/2014/023 [http://perma.cc/92BN-786X]; About IEX,
supra note 174.
192. Bradley Hope, Debate Over High-Frequency Trading on IEX Muddied by Trade Counting, WALL
ST. J. MONEYBEAT (Aug. 11, 2014, 10:05 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/08/11/
debate-over -high-frequency-trading-on -iex-muddied-by-trade -counting [perma.cc/MS8F-
N2LB].
193. See Easleyet al., supra note 72.
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new. It is a departure from past practice where market makers were scrupulously
scrutinized for signs they might be exploiting their positional access for private
gain. With such determinations impossible, as HET traders compete for their
own books rather than for clients or as formal market makers, novel approaches
are needed. Seen from this perspective, imposing costs through mandatory de-
lays-while far from ideal-provides a way forward to better align existing in-
formation costs imposed by insider trading laws with existing practice.
C. The Impact of Irreconcilability
In the absence of reform, modern market structure poses an existential
challenge to the law and policy prohibiting insider trading. This Article
shows that: (i) modern markets systematically give select HFT traders first
access to not-fully-public information; (ii) this special structural access for
HFT traders produces harms in the market that are commonly controlled by
the prohibition against insider trading; and (iii) despite falling within the am-
bit of harms controlled by the prohibition, doctrine has no power to remedy
them. Viewed through the lens of market infrastructure, it becomes clear that
conventional doctrine is poorly equipped to deal with the complexities of in-
creasing innovation.194
The nonapplication of current insider trading laws to market structure ap-
pears remarkable in the context of their larger role in policing securities markets.
Their extraordinary power has been on full display after the financial crisis, as
seen in a slew of high-profile civil and criminal proceedings against some of Wall
Street's former stars. Cases against business tycoons like Raj Rajaratnam of the
Galleon Fund, Rajat Gupta, former head of McKinsey, as well as Steve Cohen's
SAC Capital have evidenced the high confidence public authorities have placed
in the policing power of the prohibition.95 While doctrine suffered a notable
setback in the wake of U.S. v. Newman-a case limiting the reach of tipper-
tippee liability under the classical theory of insider trading-the power of the
prohibition has otherwise been on the ascendancy.96
The argument put forward in this Article, however, calls into question the
efficacy of the prohibition to fulfill its role as a protective safeguard for confiden-
tial information in public markets. First, as this Article has shown, doctrine plac-
es significant costs on corporate insiders as well as a wide range of outsider
194. See Yadav, supra note 9.
195. SEC ENFORCEMENT CASES, supra note 111.
196. SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir.
2014). For discussion, see Langevoort, supra note 123.
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fiduciaries. The interplay between the dassical theory, misappropriation, Reg
FD, and Rule 10b5-2 creates a complex lattice of constraints that limit insider
trading on confidential corporate information. Deferring to the goal of investor
protection, insiders internalize high costs in the form of lost profits, missed op-
portunities, and the capital costs of holding or divesting of their securities. And,
critically, the market relies on these protections to hold, assuring investors-at-
large that they can trade without discounting for the risks that corporate insiders
will always beat them to the best rades.7'
Despite imposing heavy constraints on corporate insiders, structural insiders
are left untouched under current doctrine. On the one hand, this is understanda-
ble. Corporate insider trading punishes fiduciaries that fail to disclose confiden-
tial information to investors, as evidenced by the need to show a breach of
fiduciary duty. Possessing the deepest sources of internal information, informed
insiders can easily outwit investors with the force of their high quality infor-
mation and their persuasive influence on price formation. On this basis, it makes
sense that the prohibition should focus its resources on controlling the conduct of
corporate insiders-rather than on the structural insiders that simply operational-
ize the trading process.
But this argument strains under interrogation. The prohibition cannot
reach instances of structural insider trading because there is no obvious deception.
HFT traders operate in open view and their practices are institutionalized by pri-
vate exchanges through regulatory permission, meaning that the misappropria-
tion theory of liability cannot apply. Still, insider-trading doctrine has never
really been rooted in a robust notion of deception in the first place.9 Chiarella
and Dirks tenuously read deception into the Rule 10b-5 prohibition using the le-
gal convenience offered by the breach of fiduciary duty. Deception, as properly
understood under Rule 10b-5 liability for fraud and manipulation, connects
weakly, if at all, to the notion of a breach of fiduciary duty in insider trading.99
Moreover, on whether corporate insiders pose the most risk to investors, the law
has worked hard to protect investors against those whose informational access to
corporations has been indirect.2°° In other words, the law has paid only passing
heed to the quality of information held by insiders, looking only for the artifice of
fiduciary duty to ground liability. As shown in the expansion of liability under
the misappropriation doctrine and Rule 10b5-2, whether defendants possessed
197. See Wang, supra note 4.
198. See Langevoort, supra note 123.
199. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976).
200. SEC v. Dorozkho, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009).
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strong, market-moving information has never been a primary concern for the
law. Rather, the key question has hinged on the loss of profitable privileges in in-
formation for investors in favor of a cohort of insiders.
As shown here, the harms generated by structural insider trading are largely
coextensive with those seen in more conventional, corporate cases. While they
might seem different on the surface, the costs they create sit along a continuum
long familiar to scholars of insider trading. Loss of information through order
anticipation, unequal access to information, as well as potential for deterioration
in market quality on account of insider trading, have all been observed, to varying
degrees, in the case of HiT. That the law applies to one set of insiders to control
such harms-but not another-points to a legal regime sorely out-paced by in-
novation and unable to consistently fulfill its basic function. The rise of structural
insider trading, fundamentally, calls into question the inner coherence of the pro-
hibition and points to the need to rethink its foundations. If the law can only ap-
ply effectively to core corporate insiders, this should be made explicit and the
doctrine should be recalibrated to reflect this limited reach. But even this nar-
rower application poses a problem. Why should the law protect investors from
one set of insiders, but leave them open to harm from another? If it is ultimately a
question of safeguarding investor protection, there does not appear to be any
good answer to the inquiry.
CONCLUSION
This Article shows that the emergence of high frequency trading-and
the structural practices that have facilitated it-profoundly challenge the foun-
dations of the prohibition against insider trading. While HFT has brought
ample benefits to securities trading, preferential access to information for fast
traders causes harms similar to those seen in conventional corporate insider
trading. Structural insider trading also recasts the usual debates that have pit
investor protection against market efficiency. Policymakers now face trade-offs
calibrated between investor harms and structural efficiencies as they craft legis-
lative objectives for market design. This Article represents a first step toward
identifying the doctrinal and policy uncertainties underlying the prohibition in
modern, algorithmic markets. More urgent analysis and debate is necessary to
identify further complexities and regulatory responses to more coherently regu-
late the flow of confidential information in securities markets.
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Appendix 1 provides a schematic outline of how information is incorporated into prices
in a market with co-located HFTs. Suppose that new information on Stock X is fed at
Time 0 (simultaneously) into the direct feed and the SIP feed. Suppose also that Stock X
is trading at $100 at Time 0, and the net effect of this information will be to eventually
change the price of Stock X to $101. This information travels about 1000 feet along the
direct feed to the co-located servers of HFTs and reaches them at Time 1. HFTs algo-
rithmically review and process the information and trade on it. The orders are sent for
execution back about 1000 feet to the exchange server and get executed at Time 2. The
trading actions of co-located HFTs changes the price to $101 at Time 2. All of thisac-
tion takes place potentially in the space of microseconds. The information travels along
the direct feed for (say) 100 miles and reaches other direct-feed investors at Time 3, well
after the trading actions of HFTs have already impacted the price at Time 2. The infor-
mation also travels along the SIP for (say) 100 miles and reaches other SIP investors at
Time 4, typically after Time 3 and, in any case, well after Time 2.
